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ABSTRACT
A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF GREEN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
AS A POST-DISASTER RECOVERY APPROACH:
THE CASE OF GREENSBURG, KANSAS 2007-2012
by David Edgardo Leiva
December 2013
In May 2007, an EF-5 tornado ripped through and annihilated 95% of
Greensburg, Kansas, a town of about 1,500 people in the southwestern portion of the
state. On the heels of the disastrous Hurricane Katrina federal response and with the
promise of two sitting presidents to use all of the federal support available, the town
vowed not only to "survive, but thrive." Months later, Greensburg civic, business and
elected leaders - with a host of external expertise - unveiled a recovery plan that not only
set in motion the rebuilding of the two-square mile town but also offered the opportunity
to become the first model green city in the United States. Media captured the daily
struggles of Greensburg for years, and tourists, academicians, and elected officials have
come from all over the world to witness how this small town has used sustainability
practices. Today, the city boasts the most environmentally-friendly and architecturally
rich buildings per capita in America. However, beneath the coating of eco-friendly public
buildings and energy-efficient homes propped up by unprecedented financial, technical
and federal support, brews a quiet storm of smaller tax rolls, higher taxes, an underused
business incubator, empty business park, decreasing revenue streams, growing consumer
debt, increased number of mortgages past due by 90 days, and a clock ticking until 2018
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when homeowners must pay the full property tax rates that have been delayed by a
decade. The population has not returned to pre-storm levels as predicted by the same
group ofleaders. The media no longer visits. Six years later, America' s role model for the
green technology movement looks more like a cautionary tale of outsider influence,
misunderstood economic development principles, and a hint of buyers' remorse.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY
Background
When the class of 2008 walks across the stage today, you will send a powerful
message to our nation: Greensburg, Kansas, is back, and its best days are ahead .
. . . The leaders of your town understand that out of the devastation of the storm
comes an opportunity to rebuild with a free hand and a clean slate. They envision
a future where new jobs flourish, where every public building meets the highest
environmental standards, and where the beauty of rural America meets the great
possibilities of new technology. The community is dedicated to putting the
"green" in Greensburg. And as you work to achieve this vision, the Federal
Government will honor its commitments and continue to stand by you. (Bush,
2008, p. 636)

It has been five years since George W. Bush became the first president to ever
give a high school commencement address as he did so for the Greensburg, Kansas class
of 2008. The tornado that lasted 65 minutes, had a width of 1.7 miles, traveled nearly 29
miles, reached winds of 205 miles per hour, and annihilated Greensburg is now all but a
distant memory except to those who experienced it. With several options on the table, the
residents of Greensburg elected to rebuild, and they did so with the future in mind. Had
they chosen to dissolve the city and move to neighboring towns, the populace would have
been in fair company, joining at least 130 other cities that have dissolved since 2000
(Anderson, 2012).

--
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Figure 1. Greensburg, Kansas Tornado 2007 (photo by Greg Henshall/U.S. FEMA).

As a result ofleadership, innovation, and nearly $100 million in reconstruction
funding through various sources, today Greensburg is America' s green city model
according to the National Renewable Energy Laboratory, a federal installation funded by
the U.S. Department of Energy. The federal agency says that the town of Greensburg
serves as "a national model for green communities" (DOE, 2012a, p. l ) because of nearly
all light-emitting diode, or LED, streetlights; the use of utility-scale and distributed
renewable energy; every public building meeting strict national sustainability standards;
family homes adopting energy-efficient building codes; altering individual and
commercial practices and behaviors; and spearheading the international discussion of the
merits ofrebuilding with posterity in mind (NREL, 2012). Others have also taken notice
such as the online travel Web site, Budgettravel.com, who voted Greensburg one of the
top 10 coolest small towns in America (Budgettravel.com, 2011 ). Simply put,
Greensburg is an urban planner's vision of Utopia, a nod to other future city
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developments that should take a cue from this Midwest town and consider that
sustainable development is not actual improvement if the growth leads to the destruction
of the environment (Howarth & Farber, 2002). For those who study rural communities in
crisis and seeking prosperity, Greensburg serves as a beacon of hope. (Berkebile &
Hardy, 2010)
The lessons learned in Greensburg could be transferred to thousands of struggling
small towns across the nation. Even large metropolises are taking note and
learning relevant lessons. Greensburg is redefining what is possible in rural
America; it is serving as a model for the sustainable rural community for the
sustainable rural community of the future. (Berkebile & Hardy, 2010, p. 39)

But the attention has since waned, and the future of this futuristic city appears, at
least at the moment, uncertain. Celebrity Leonardo DiCaprio and others, who came in
immediately after the storm, have long since moved onto other green projects while the
directors from Planet Earth and ABC, along with the national media, have long since
wrapped up production on their documentaries and stopped following the daily tasks of
Greensburg' s rebuilding. In 2012, a German eco-wall manufacturer walked away from
negotiations after seven months, a big blow considering it was to employ about 30 people
(Clement, 2012a). Then, the city entered into an agreement with a solar panel
manufacturer in July 2012 that would have made them the first occupant of the industrial
park, but the business site remains vacant more than a year later (Clement, 2012b).
Moreover, a recent study has suggested that Greensburg's small school district - with less
than 250 students and dependent on the federal government for 85% of its funding could shut down as a result of Congress' inability to pass a budget (AASA, 2012). As
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such, six years after an EF-5 tornado ripped through and destroyed 95% of Greensburg,
this rural Midwest town of less than 800 people and about two-square miles sits on the
precipice of continuing its pre-storm population decline en route to becoming extinct, a
remarkable tum of events considering the vast amount of resources that were allocated to
tum the rural area into a model for implementing green technology. All of these scenarios
lead to the ultimate question of just how sustainable, in economic development terms, is
Greensburg since taking a green economic development approach? One scholar has
already opined that Greensburg is "inspiring," but it should not be held as the model for
post-disaster recovery (Rozdilsky, 2012, p. 10).
Conceptual Underpinnings for the Study
At the moment, this thesis examines three aspects: the growing costs and
frequency of disasters; the post-disaster recovery effort for businesses and individuals;
and the green movement as a plausible economic development approach. Each year, the
cost of natural disasters sets new records, even when the number of disasters may be
similar or less. In an effort to improve response and mitigate future catastrophes, postdisaster recovery efforts are being planned and executed, with the federal government
playing the lead role by offering funding and technical assistance. Recently, green
economic development - with a growing following of environmentalists, urban planners
and international organizations - has captured the attention of government, academia, and
popular media, while offering little understanding of the economic principles that support
it. Instead, this type of development relies on a theoretical framework that is based on a
holistic approach that measures growth with three pillars, or the triple bottom line:
environmental protection, social equity, and economic development. They are referred to
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as the three Es, credited to John Elkington's work that sought to introduce other
accounting methods not typically considered (Elkington, 1994).
The pursuit of the triple bottom line is a framework for comprehending the scale
for other green-related scholarship as it contributes considerably to understanding the
literature and the various merits that cannot be measured in dollar terms alone. For
instance, in a sort of scoring rubrics, Schilling and Logan (2008) summarize the literature
to encapsulate the environmental, societal, and local economic benefits from 10 urban
greening initiatives. Most of these projects, initiatives and undertakings achieve two of
the three goals, but only increasing the access to healthy, local food captures all three Es
so that the environment, society and local economy benefit from its pursuits (American
Planning Association, 2007; Baroff, 2006; Hung, 2004). Meanwhile, the environment and
local economy benefit when communities address flooding and reducing storm water
runoff (Carroll, 2006; Kloss & Calaruss, 2006). Society and the local economy benefit
from increased physical activity opportunities (Kahn et al., 2002). Separately, the
environment benefits from reduced urban heat island effect (Hardin & Jensen, 2007); the
social benefits occur when opportunities are provided to create community through social
interactions (Coley, Sullivan, & Kuo, 1997); reduce Attention Deficit Hyper Disorder in
children (Taylor, Kuo, & Sullivan, 2001); improve self-discipline in inner-city girls
(Taylor, Kuo, & Sullivan, 2002); and reduce crime and domestic violence (Kuo &
Sullivan, 2001 b ); while the local economy benefits from increased potential consumer
spending (Wolf, 2005); and increased property values (Voicu & Been, 2008; Wachter,
2004; Wachter & Gillen, 2006) . Therefore, it must be clear that there are other metrics
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considered by the federal government's principal agents of improving the nation's
sustainability and energy efficiency standards.
Statement of the Problem
There can be conflict in the philosophies after a catastrophic disaster.
Professionals of emergency management might see the need to quickly stabilize the tax
base and resist comprehensive plans, innovations, and studies as they are "purchased at
heavy post-disaster coin, a high cost in precious time and anxious uncertainty" (Haas,
Kates, & Bowden, 1977, p. xxxiii). Compare that viewpoint with those of the planning
profession who have had a lion's share of influence in this area, even teaming up with the
U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency (1998) to produce a recovery manual for
local leaders, Planning for Post-Disaster Recovery and Reconstruction. The federal
agency followed up with Lessons in Community Recovery: Seven Years ofEmergency
Support Function #14 Long-Term Community Recovery from 2004 to 2011. These works
(2011) highlight the successes and lessons learned from long-term recovery efforts in 16
case studies nationwide, including Greensburg. In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina,
the planning profession staked its position, as Olshansky (2006) reminds us:
Post-disaster recovery is all about urban planning. This is not an area that we can
leave to emergency managers, engineers, architects, the military, insurers, or
bankers. Recovery, like planning, is all about creating livable, sustainable places
for people to live and work. The fact that it takes place under extreme
circumstances, and demands rapid action with severely constrained resources,
requires the expertise that planners have to offer. (Olshansky, 2006, p.153)
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Among the criticism of these principles is the omission of standing thoughts on
how economic growth is influenced by four factors: the annual growth of resources
available, such as human and physical capital and natural resources; the productivity of
the resources and workforce; improvements in technology; and the efficient and
improved use of the inputs. Productivity, measured in terms of labor, improves with
equipment innovations and new skills and education. The process of economic growth
can be improved should businesses and individuals consume less and save more over the
long run; it contributes to growth in productive capacity (Hyman, 1994). Another
measure shows that total consumer debt could be of considerable concern for
Greensburg. During the first quarter of 2012, mortgage delinquencies in the city and
Kiowa County were considerably higher as compared to national rates (Federal Reserve
Bank of Kansas City, 2012). Furthermore, large grants, donations or tax deferrals have
the ability to mask the financial wherewithal of the city. This leads to the potential for
"inefficient local revenue decisions," (Slack, 2005, p. 69) where large operating budget
and capital costs pricing is being put off until later because it is currently being handled
through outside contributions or some other third party. If other revenue streams, such as
federal funding handle the costs, there might be no incentive to use volumetric pricing to
reduce the demand for water (Slack, 2005).
Just how long it takes to see the benefits from green economic development is
unclear and that level of uncertainty coupled with the expected timeframe of most
disaster recoveries - 100 times the emergency period and 10 times the restoration period
with symbolic betterment reconstruction potentially constituting two to three times longer
(Haas et al., 1977) - should give some pause. It has not. In fact, the U.S. Government

__

,
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Accountability Office noted that the federal response should conclude one year after the
disaster (Czerwinski, 2012).
Purpose of the Study
Greensburg was founded in 1886 and named after a local stage coach owner,
Donald R. Green, who established the company to meet the demand of passengers who
were making their way through the prairies. The stage line became obsolete when the
railroad made its way through the town years later. By 1888, a well was dug to provide
water for the steam engines of passing trains. It remained a node between the towns of
Pratt and Dodge City, losing population each year with only a portion of its economy
coming from the long history of agriculture. In May 2007, the opportunity came to
rebuild the town after the tornado by being innovative, and potentially, curing the other
ailments of population decline. With no other considerable example to glean from, the
novelty of this approach required a grander understanding of green economic
development's implications and the tools necessary to implement it. Nearly all of the
city' s residents needed to be educated on what it would mean to tum Greensburg into a
green city, the green economic development pursuits that it would bring and the benefits.
In the case of this southwestern Kansas town, it was being educated, and with the whole
world watching. The urban planners, architects, and federal regulators who encouraged
the city's leadership, residents, and businesses to become a model city expected the
novelty and environmentally friendly concepts to augment other recognized and
generally-accepted economic metrics.
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Research Question 1

Five years later, how well does Greensburg, Kansas, serve as a national model of
green economic development as a post-disaster recovery approach in the context of a
global market economy?
Hypothesis 1

The town of Greensburg and Kiowa County will regain its population as projected
by the designers of the Greensburg comprehensive sustainable plan evidenced by sales
tax increases.
Hypothesis 2

The town of Greensburg and Kiowa County will experience sustained housing
prices for the newly built environmentally-friendly homes due to people moving into the
city.
Hypothesis 3

The town of Greensburg will reach energy goals that save 30-40 % on its
Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design (LEED-rated) public buildings
compared to typical buildings of similar size, which will result in lower utility and water
costs over the five-year period.
Hypothesis 4

Neighboring cities and counties will experience some minor declines to their
financial health when the Greensburg population moves back to Greensburg.
Limitations, Assumptions, and Design Controls
There are limitations to this study ranging from the time span to the data
collection efforts to the inability to study the metrics of surrounding towns and counties.
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In terms of the time frame, five years of financial statements is not nearly enough data to
come to any conclusion on whether green economic development is effective. Also, it is
difficult to separate what impact the persistent economic recession had on recovery
efforts, or what might have happened had the town chosen to pursue a different recovery
approach (Sparks & White, 2013). This research included only one visit to Greensburg,
and that restricted the number of contacts, particularly since it occurred five years after
the storm, when so many of the people had long gone. Another limitation was the
willingness and ability of key subjects, including the current mayor and city
administrator, to answer specific question,s. Lastly, the lack ofresources curtailed the
ability to contact people in other communities for more interviews.
Most of the reviewed literature tends to be favorable towards sustainability and
the green movement as a whole, and the tone tends to show it. There are very few
dissenters, and even fewer efforts to collect data from people who opposed the greening
of Greensburg, particularly early on. As the tragedy reaches significant anniversaries,
additional research is needed to fully assess the impact occurring in the fifth, tenth, and
twentieth year anniversaries. Most researchers range from architects, urban planners,
geographers, and emergency managers. According to several city officials, not one
researcher made a public information request for the city' s financial statements, nor did
anyone ask questions pertaining to the fiscal strength of the city. This is an important
point because most of the data gathered since the storm has come in the forms of
interviews and surveys that only appear to have caught anecdotal snapshots of all the data
that was actually available at the time.
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Definition of Key Terms
Preparedness implies the degree to which an individual, organization,

community, state, or nation is prepared to confront the challenges brought on by a
disaster. Response includes the actions taken, such as search and rescue efforts,
immediately following the disaster. Mitigation actions help reduce the impact and longterm risk to human life and property (Smith, 2004). Finally, recovery offers the most
complex and ambiguous phase, particularly since it offers principles but no solid metric
for measuring success and failure. As such, sustainable disaster recovery is a process
undertaken by a range of stakeholders that goes beyond the basic reconstruction of the
community, region, or state to its pre-disaster condition and allows for social, economic,
and environmental factors to be achieved during the recovery to enhance the lives of the
current population and future generation (Smith, 2004).
During the last 20 years, a new urban planning and transportation theory has
evolved oriented around limiting growth through mixed-use developments and using
walkways and bicycle-friendly streets to counter sprawl. The term smart growth includes
10 principles: mix land use; take advantage of compact building design; create a range of
housing opportunities and choices; create walkable neighborhoods; foster distinctive,
attractive communities with a strong sense of place; preserve open space farmland,
natural beauty, and critical environmental areas; strengthen and direct development
towards existing communities; provide a variety of transportation choices; make
development decisions predictable, fair, and cost-effective; and encourage community
and stakeholder collaboration in development decisions (Smart Growth Network, 2006).
Though there are distinctions, confusion can be expected when other notable terms are
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mentioned interchangeably and become synonyms: New Urbanism, New Community
Design; Traditional Neighborhood Development; Triple Bottom Line of People, Planet
and Profits; Three Es of Equity, Environment, and Economic; and Sustainable
Development.
Even as the field of local and regional economic development continues to
evolve, there has not been an adequate amount of research about how well the green
economic development approach works within the frame of a global economy, or if the
relatively new initiative should be considered as an economic development approach to
begin with. First, Malizia and Feser (1999) make no mention of green economic
development in their summary of the noteworthy economic development theories that
shaped local and regional economies through the end of the millennium. Second, green
economic development, sometimes referred to as sustainable economic development,
takes many forms, and a strict definition has not been developed or widely-accepted
(Chapple, 2008; Kates, Parris, & Leiserowitz, 2005).
A nearly universally accepted explanation of sustainability comes from a United
Nations declaration - "development that meets the needs of the present without
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs" (Brundtland,
1987, p. 45) Even without a clear-cut metric, many cities worldwide are drawing up and
executing costly, idealistic master plans that incorporate sustainability in the midst of a
worldwide recession, with little accompanying research that gives a definitive answer as
to its merits and successes long-term in an era of deepening globalization. Many
proponents of the green movement offer anecdotal and short-term evidence. Even more
telling is that the literature is scant as to whether or not green development is appropriate
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following an extraordinary destruction when there is a premium on decision-making,
time, energy, and limited resources. The answer should be found in the field of economic
development; however, part of the reason for the conflict is that this field is not a standalone academic discipline. Instead, theories on the best approach tend to be influenced by
scholars who specialize in other areas such as business, city and regional planning,
demography, education, economics, geography, public policy, political science, and
sociology (Blakely & Leigh, 2010).
Summary
There were a very unique set of circumstances that turned an unlikely small
Midwestern town into the national green city model. The opportunity to answer the
questions that have puzzled researchers for decades were found in a town willing to
reinvent itself. With Greensburg as the perfect case study, it provides an opportunity to
see how to reverse population migration, how to harness other forms of energy, how to
live sustainably, and whether this very idea could actually work. Greensburg was a
laboratory, a chance to put all of these questions at bay, with a real, unobstructed answer.
Greensburg did not have to rebuild a portion of its town; it had to start over completely.
Six years after the storm and five years after completing the Greensburg Sustainable
Comprehensive Plan, some measure of progress should be available, and hopefully, some
of the questions closer to being answered.
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CHAPTER II
REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE
Introduction
For decades the green movement, commonly referred to as sustainable
development, has worked to separate itself from the other movements, trying even to find
a suitable definition. Yet, there are a myriad of ways of defining and implementing green
technology and sustainable development. Is it an economic development strategy, a goal,
or a policy? If policy, how long should it last? By some measurements, like the Global
Scenario Group, perhaps until the year 2050 (Kates et al., 2005). Scholars note the
conundrum:
The identification of what constitutes competence in sustainability is still at a
nascent stage.. .. It is difficult to imagine creating an academic field that is
neither anchored in a discipline nor an amalgamation of parts of different
disciplines. Genuine sustainability (as opposed to eclectic or add-on approaches)
is a problem-driven and solution-oriented field that derives its integrity from a
holistic approach to problems that are multifaceted, dynamic, and not bound by
traditional disciplines. A genuine approach to sustainability requires us to
critically analyze and adapt methods and theories from other disciplines for their
contribution to sustainability. Still, the field cannot arise from a void; it has to rely
to a certain extent on established methods and concepts. (Wiek, Withycombe,
Redman, & Mills, 201 1, p. 8)
Even among the experts of this field, the definitions of terms such as sustainable,
sustainable city, green city, future city, Eco-City, are vague and contradictory. The three
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pillars of sustainability fall under social equity, environmental protection, and economic
growth, an idea that was first raised in a United Nations conference in 1987 headed by
Gro H. Brundtland, the former Norwegian prime minister (Lehmann, 2010). The
Brundtland Report: Our Common Future gave the world its first crack at a definition:

Sustainable development is development that meets the needs of the present without
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs (Brundtland,
1987). Other research suggests that the environment does not actually act as a pillar; it is
"not a competing interest to be balanced with the economy, but rather an envelope
surrounding human society and the economy" (Greenwood & Holt, 2010, p. 50).
Among economic developers, generally accepted economic development
strategies tend to center around economic base theory, staple theory, sector theory,
growth pole, regional concentration and diffusion theories, neoclassical growth theory,
interregional trade theory, product cycle theory, entrepreneurship theory, flexible
specialization, and as of late, Blue Ocean theory and creative class (Blakely & Leigh,
201O; Malizia & Feser, 1999). With the underpinnings of a strategy in place,
policymakers can then pursue guidelines through legislation, tax incentives, and decisions
on where to redevelop and reinvest land-use and growth since these tend to fall under the
purview oflocal economic developers, and planners while disaster mitigation tends to
remain the responsibility of emergency management. Yet, when a state or municipality
adopts sustainability policies or legislation, disaster mitigation is rarely a component
(Sun, 2011). Following disasters, the impetus is on a speedy recovery to pre-disaster
form, even when there is a window of opportunity to rebuild stronger and provide
comprehensive strategies. Savvy communities, which bring in multiple stakeholders and
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scholars, actually improve the quality oflife, enhance local economies, and improve
environmental conditions (Smith & Wegner, 2007). However, those communities are
rare.
Post-Disaster Recovery
Since 1988, the Belgium-based World Health Organization Collaborating Center
for Research on the Epidemiology of Disaster (CRED) has maintained a worldwide
database on disasters, recording the occurrence and impacts of more than 19,500 disasters
dating back to 1900. In 2011 , a mere 332 recorded natural disasters worldwide cost a
record $336 billion, according to CRED. In human terms, the disasters killed 30,774
people and impacted 245 million people across the globe. If it seems like there are more
disasters now than ever before, that is merely the appearance. In absolute relative terms,
2011 was a better year than most. CRED reports that there are typically 384 disasters a
year, and in 2010, the Haiti earthquake alone killed 225,000 people. In the United States,
between 2000 and 2009, disaster costs were calculated at $344 billion (Guha-Sapir, Vos,
Below, & Ponserre, 2012).
Prior to a disaster, political leanings for and against are balanced with regards to
mitigation. However, up to six months after a disaster, public opinion shifts toward
mitigation. Yet, after 18 months, voters get disillusioned and apathy sets in, thus
challenging any hope of community buy-in (Paul & Che, 2011).
Disaster recovery is the process of restoring, rebuilding, and reshaping the

physical, social, economic, and natural environment following a disaster. Long-term
recovery encompasses several reconstruction aspects so that the community returns to its
prior state, while taking the opportunity to mitigate against future disasters (Eadie et al.,
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2001). This process takes place within the four phases of emergency management widely
recognized by FEMA: preparedness, response, recovery and mitigation. Theoretically,
once an event has occurred, the process starts over with mitigation and preparation for the
next unannounced event. However, the process is hardly seamless because disasters tax
every facet of daily living and a return to normalcy conflicts with deliberate planning
(Olshansky, 2006).
When the president declares a national emergency, at least 14 federal departments
and agencies are responsible for administering dozens of recovery-related programs,
many of which require the active participation of state and local governments that
maintain the lead in disaster recovery (Czerwinski, 2012). Four agencies, however, play
predominant roles including FEMA, the Department of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD), the Small Business Administration (SBA), and the Economic Development
Administration (EDA). HUD assists low-income families and provides Community
Development Block Grants to counties and cities to support redevelopment. The SBA
offers low-interest loans to business owners and homeowners. The EDA offers lowinterest loans to nonprofit organizations that assist in community development.
In 2008, the EDA awarded $2.3 million to rebuild Greensburg's Main Street
infrastructure while the U.S. Department of Agriculture assisted in the building of the
business incubator. "The coordinated response amplifies the efforts of EDA and
underscores the importance of collaboration among federal agencies in terms of regional
recovery efforts," said Jeff Finkle, president of the International Economic Development
Council, in an interview (EDA, 2012, para. 17).
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FEMA serves the principle responsibility of coordinating the federal response to
major declarations of disaster, through the process known as Emergency Support
Function #14 Long-Term Community Recovery. In 2011, FEMA released a report,
Lessons in Supporting Community Recovery, which brought together seven years of

examples and lessons learned that it would give public, private and nonprofit groups, or
the "whole community," as part of the National Disaster Recovery Framework. The
organization states:
When a disaster event occurs, it shocks and changes the entire community system
all at once. The amount of time it takes for a community to recover from a
disaster event will vary, depending on the scale and timing of the disaster, the
state and local community's capacity to address recovery issues, and the
influences of the larger region and economy. (FEMA, 2011 , p. 51)
That report - and others authored by the federal government - offer holistic
elements that run the gamut of housing, community involvement, business retention, and
other aspects ofrecovery. However, they only skim over the economics of the ideas
suggested for implementation. The report falls short of offering a suggestion for the best
economic development approach a municipality or region should consider, a substantial
problem since the disaster brings on different turmoil in a capitalistic society. The
competitive system in the United States is constantly offering new markets and
opportunities in an effort to reduce the turnover time of capital. When local economies
are disrupted, individuals and businesses look elsewhere to shop, work, live, or start over.
If a community decides to quickly rebuild but looks very similar to other areas and loses

its distinctive sense of place - the very reason it attracted residents in the first place -
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businesses and residents leave these "restless landscapes" (Knox & Mayer, 2011 , p. 14 ).
This is of considerable concern because complete restoration from catastrophic losses can
take up to 10 years, (see Figure 2) and, in extreme cases, nearly 20 years (Haas et al. ,
1977; Kates, Laska, & Leatherman, 2006). Illustrating the point, the literature on the
assessed value of single-family housing recovery after a disaster has historically mirrored
the findings of Haas et al. (1977). However, damaged properties after 1992 's Hurricane
Andrew still had not returned to their pre-disaster value in 1996 (Zhang & Peacock,
2010).
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Figure 2. The Long-Term Recovery Period.

Even after the physical damage is cleared, aid to help the surrounding community
recover has an equal impact to provide direct aid to businesses (Corey & Deitch, 2011).
For businesses, population losses expressed in lost customer base and staff accounted for
21 % of the variability in post-Hurricane Katrina organizational performance. The 1995
Kobe earthquake aftermath had similar findings with 12% fewer businesses six years
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later, and a Gross Regional Product of 91 % of pre-earthquake levels, much of which is
credited to the population recovery a decade after the earthquake (Chang, 2010). But
other economic sectors were not as resilient. The Port of Kobe, sixth largest at the time of
the disaster, never regained its stature after being decimated and is now stabilized at half
of its pre-earthquake cargo traffic (Chang, 2010). Jeffrey Sjostrom, president of the
Galveston Economic Development Partnership, echoed the observation that business
recovery is left to fend for itself while priority is placed on housing, infrastructure, social
services, health care, and public safety (Sjostrom, 2011 ).
During these disasters, the wealthy may suffer losses, but their insurance,
financial assets, and stable employment give them a protective wall against total loss that
low-income families do not have. Even when the middle class and wealthy experience
greater absolute losses than the poor, the poor lose a greater percentage. Their recovery is
prolonged, and years of progress are washed away (Wisner & Luce, 1993).
FEMA ' s aid focuses on these shorter-term issues aimed at making individuals
whole by filling gaps that its own resources cannot accomplish. The aid does not address
problems oflong-term vulnerability, often found in certain groups, who had issues preexisting the disaster (Bolin & Stanford, 1998). For instance, the 1994 Northridge,
California earthquake cost nearly $35 billion with federal aid constituting $11 billion in
assistance for Los Angeles and Ventura counties, but the amounts did not alleviate some
of the hidden long-term structural economic issues for low-income residents (Bolin &
Stanford, 1998). These disasters set back communities and cities decades. Globally, these
disasters are even worse as cities in poorer countries usually suffer more when their
losses are measured either as a proportion of GDP or in terms of access to safety nets,
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including insurance, which usually leads to rerouting meager resources from
improvements underway elsewhere (Parnell, Simon, & Vogel, 2007).
These problems and market inefficiencies take decades and centuries to evolve
and resolve, and seeking recovery more quickly than the same devastated city took to
actually develop is an unreasonable expectation. When communities experience growth,
it usually comes in five stages (Thompson, 1968), beginning with exporting a certain
dominant product which serves as the basis for other economic activities. During the
second stage, local production broadens, and the suppliers increase their markets. During
the third stage, import substitution occurs. The fourth stage of growth occurs when the
local economy is sufficient to serve as a node. During the fifth phase, the city is now
sophisticated and a leader in certain industries. Jane Jacobs' own observation (1970)
echoes that "a city grows by a process of gradual diversification and differentiation of its
economy, starting from little or nothing more than its initial export work and the
suppliers to that work" (p. 129). Blakely and Leigh (2010) purport the critical resources
necessary for local economic development include materials - such as land, buildings,
and location; infrastructure; human capital; markets; management; and financing. Once a
city is established, city leaders work hard to encourage more people to move there in a
self-fulfilling prophesy of creating more jobs, more revenue, better education, and better
services in a race for a higher standard of living (Sun, 2011).
Those cities that emerge as the financial centers will increase their share of
population and clout, beginning with the importance of supporting wholesalers
specializing in export business. Small towns, such as Greensburg, then are left to an
endless struggle to compete, yet lack the efficiency of capital, transportation, and labor
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compared to larger, more established neighboring towns and cities. More likely, the
larger firms, located in larger, regional areas, will operate branches in small towns, and
export the towns ' savings and capital back to the cities. Even with technology working to
even the playing field, smaller towns start the race miles behind. The clustering of
industries and businesses and city hierarchy theory explains the higher productivity of
larger cities with all the semblance of cosmopolitan riches: international airports, state
courts, entertainment venues, large hospitals, and universities. These venues are the
workplaces of specialized professionals who can demand higher salaries. As a result, they
tend to live in these cities, thus, taking a higher proportion of citizens with higher
salaries.
Not every city aspires to become a megatropolis. Yet, there are some cities that
cannot muster enough critical mass of institutional and social capital just to have a
sustainable economy. In his book, Beyond Smart Cities: How Cities Network, Learn and
Innovate, Tim Campbell (2012) identified six reasons why communities do not achieve a

sustainable economy. First, natural disasters disrupt the social capital and institutional
wherewithal to undertake learning on a systematic basis. Second, innovation is seen
dubiously and blocks free and open exchange. Third, the push for new leadership and
change agents destroys the continuity that was once there, and the institutional
knowledge is lost. Fourth, poverty creeps into everyday life and suffocates new ideas,
clouds political insights, and shapes the agenda. Fifth, not every citizen is informed or
has the technical expertise to make sound decisions. Sixth, those who share the same
streets, same language, and same climate, share nothing else.
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Capitalism, Politics, and Recovery
It was the French philosopher Alexis de Tocqueville who observed that politics
and economics are tied at the hip in America - one cannot move without influencing the
other - for better or for worse (Scott, 2009). While some argue that coastal cities and
those with cultural revolutions brought about by wealth disparities have gone on to
become some of the world ' s greatest cities, there is something to be said about geography
and technological development (Kennedy, 2011). In terms of the world' s
underdeveloped nations, underdevelopment has not resulted from the survival of archaic
institutions and the existence of capital shortage 1n regions that have remained isolated
from world history. Rather, underdevelopment is generated by the development of
capitalism itself (Frank, 1994).
Capitalism, or the idea of a free market, has never been as pure in America as
some proclaim. According to Harvard University professor Bruce Scott, who wrote the
(2009) monograph, The Concept of Capitalism, the theories advanced by John Maynard
Keynes, Milton Friedman, and most recently, Douglas North fail to take into account that
politics has played an uneven role. Scott argues that the invisible hand of pricing
mechanism operates with a visible hand of human agents in government that establish
and maintain the institutional structures. Thus, capitalism, as an equation we only
collectively seem to understand, goes beyond supply and demand, the competition to
energize human actors, and accompanying prices to coordinate those actions (Scott,
2009). "The pricing mechanism cannot come close to achieving an optimal coordinating
role absent the effective work of the visible hand of government, often through legislative
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processes such as a parliament," he writes (Scott, 2009, p. 39). Government must play a
strong role, he concludes, as do nongovernmental organizations.
Social scientist Benjamin Timms adopted the term disaster capitalism in 2011 to
explain how nongovernmental organizations (NGO) can subvert democracy presumably unintended - by imposing neoliberal capitalist economic policies that come
in the aftermath of a disaster. Timms suggests that Naomi Klein ' s concept gives the
proper framework of how governments recapture power under the auspices of
catastrophes {Timms, 2011). The case study of peasant families being coerced to relocate
from Celaque National Park in Honduras after Hurricane Mitch struck in 1998
demonstrates how disasters can be political opportunities. In this example, the NGO set
up to manage the park was now responsible for implementing the removal policy. Since
NGOs have a history of being able to receive funding, they fill the roles abandoned by
weakened leadership and governments, and the potential exists for the NGO ' s interests to
conflict with the people they were intended to support {Timms, 2011 ). According to
Timms, "the case of coerced relocation from Celaque National Park was not a strategy of
last resort as the funding interests of environmental conservation organizations and the
agro-export coffee industry were advanced over those of the victims" {Timms, 2011, p.
1375)
Green Economic Development
The Brundtland Commission' s definition in 1987 did not settle the debate.
Instead, observers now refer to sustainable development as an oxymoron, fundamentally
contradictory and irreconcilable, since scholars and practitioners have crafted, articulated,
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and advanced their own terms, activities and agendas (Kates et al., 2005). The terms
sustainable development and green development tend to be used interchangeably.
Chapple (2008) set out to provide a comprehensive meaning for green economic
development identifying four dominant sectors: renewable energy; green building and
energy efficiency technology; energy-efficient infrastructure and transportation; and
recycling and waste-to-energy. Her survey of literature shows the range from traditional
businesses, such as utilities and professional services, which are greening their
operations, to newly emerging industries such as nanotechnology research, solar panel
manufacturing, and eco-tourism as indicated OQ the vertical axis in Figure 3. On the
horizontal axis, businesses move from those that produce green products, such as
manufacturers and food processors, to those that sell green products or participate in the
green lifestyle economy, such as farmers' markets and local park maintenance operators.
Industries produce goods that can be exported and imported between regions while
businesses revolving around lifestyle or consumption serve locals. Business categories
located in the middle of the horizontal axis contain both production and consumption
aspects. Green economic development occurs when businesses interact with and are
influenced by the government agencies, universities, non-profit organizations, unions,
utilities, and trade associations in the regional innovation system (Chapple, 2008).
Defining green economic development takes many forms in the areas of renewable
energy, green building and energy efficiency technology, energy-efficient infrastructure
and transportation, and recycling and waste-to-energy.
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Figure 3. The Multiple Facets and Stakeholders of Green Economic Development.

Chapple' s (2008) concept of green economic development, while anecdotal, is
evidenced across the nation. In 2012, the owner of the New York City's Empire State
Building commissioned a $550 million green makeover to reduce the building's energy
consumption by nearly 40% and yield $4.4 million in savings. " It's less about doing the
cool, trendy thing, and more about reducing expenses and operating more efficiently and
effectively," says Cathy Stevenson, executive vice president and leader of commercial
real estate firm Grubb and Ellis' sustainability practice (Moline, 2012, Quantifying
Returns section, para. 5). Even with more push toward clean energy, green growth has
two policy challenges: ecological scarcity of depleting resources and the funding. Edward
Barbier (2011 , p. 269) notes that "there remains a huge gap between the global benefits
that humankind receives from ecosystems and what we are willing to pay to maintain and
conserve them."
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Figu.re 4. A Wind Turbine in Greensburg (photo by David E. Leiva).
The urban planning profession (Berke, 2008) has had the most to say about the
evolution of green communities because the dimensions that have influenced city
planning since the late 191h Century take their roots from such eminent works as Ebenezer
Howard's Garden City, Frank Lloyd Wright' s Broadacre City, and Le Corbusier' s The
Radiant City. The aspects include human health, natural systems, spiritual renewal,
livability, and fair share (Berke, 2008). While the green movement has captured much
more of the academic and popular culture attention, ideas such as The 15 Core Principles
of Green Urbanism (Lehmann, 2010) are given more credence:
1. The city based on its climatic conditions and site context;
2. The city as a self-sufficient energy producer;
3. The zero-waste city as closed loop eco-system;
4. The city with closed urban water management and high water quality;
5. The city that maximizes landscapes, gardens and biodiversity;
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6. The city of eco-mobility and an efficient low-impact public transport system;
7. City construction using regional materials and prefabricated systems;
8. The city with densification and intensification of existing districts;
9. The city of deep green building design and solar access;
10. The city with special concern for affordable housing and mixed usage;
11. The city of local food and supply and high food security;
12. The city of public health and cultural identity - A safe and healthy city;
13. The city of urban governance and sustainable procurement methods;
14. The city of education and training in a sustainable urban development;
15. Particular sustainability strategies for developing countries.
Criticism of Green Development
Four professors in a little known lecture at the University of Illinois in 2009
started the initial dismissal of the idea of green jobs, referring to it as a myth with
particular emphasis on seven assumptions commonly used in academic literature and
circulated as political talking points. Those seven include: (l) there is such thing as a
green job; (2) creating green jobs will boost productive employment; (3) green jobs
forecasts are predictable; (4) green jobs promote employment growth; (5) the world
economy can be remade based on local production and reduced consumption without
dramatically decreasing human welfare; (6) mandates are a substitute for markets; and (7)
wishing for technological progress is sufficient (Morriss, Bogart, Dorchak, & Meiners,
2009). The authors contend that there is no agreement on the definition of a green job,
and as a result, leaves advocates with the duties of enlisting interest groups to " work the
political system" (p. 82) with inferior products and to make forecasts that enter in the
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public debate. The data used to create calculations, they argue, are not only optimistic,
but unfounded, and many of the successes claimed come as a result of subsidies, not
marketplace success. They contend:
We are not arguing for our own alternative set of favored policy prescriptions, but
for a different approach to the issue. By analyzing the problems with the green
jobs literature' s claims, we hope to persuade readers that the fundamental
question is not whether to spend $20 billion or $400 billion of taxpayers' money
on solar or wind power but who should decide how resources should be allocated:
people in the marketplace or planner:s and politicians in Washington, D.C.
(Morriss et al., 2009, p. 7)
What if the new energy policies have little impact on the economy as a whole
except where certain winners and losers might be directly affected in green growth and
employment, environment, and sustainable economic development? For instance, no
sound economic arguments exist to support the notion that green energy policies increase
total employment, other than the expected employment jump in manufacturing wind
turbines and other like products (Hughes, 2011). More so, the capital-intensive financial
investments of these green energy sources strip any benefits in employment (Hughes,
2011 ). Green growth that attempts to link itself to employment or environment will not
lift the poor out of poverty. In fact, it may require the loss of some environmental benefits
to "keep the growth poverty elasticity high," or it will be very expensive with the poor
paying the price of greening the Earth (Dercon, 2012, p. 16). With attention toward
sustainability in economic development, the competition between the needs of
agriculture, mining, tourism, and residential development continues to rise (Greenwood
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& Holt, 2010). More aptly put, the authors of Local Economic Development in the 21 51
Century suggest that anticipating future environmental challenges creates considerable
tradeoffs not considered previously (Greenwood & Holt, 2010).
The international perspective remains the green movement's chief ally and rival.
Even in Germany, which has experienced a financial boom during the global recession,
many of the nation's economic leaders are now signaling the need to end the European
country' s pursuit of clean energy and green economic development. In September 2013,
the European Union' s energy commissioner did not mince words. "We need industry,"
Gunther Gettinger said. He goes on to say, "We cannot be the good guys for the whole
world, ifno one follows suit" (Evans-Pritchard, 2013, para. 13).
Significance of the Study
The green movement has been followed closely and promoted widely since the
emergence of the U.S. Department of Energy. The federal government has clearly leaned
toward sustainable movement in its many forms. Social scientific debates concerning
urban development and disaster vulnerability reflect a wide variety of opinions from
recognized authorities in academia and practitioners (Parnell et al., 2007). Therein lay
the crossroads of post-disaster recovery and green development. The federal level is no
different.
Established in 2009, the federal interagency Partnership for Sustainable
Communities, consisting of the U.S. Housing and Urban Development, the U.S.
Department of Transportation, and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency leads
discussions influencing local land-use planning. The partnership coordinates federal
housing, transportation, water, and other infrastructure investments that prioritize six
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principles of livability into federal funding programs, policies, and future legislative
proposals. Those principles include providing more transportation choices; promoting
equitable and affordable housing; enhancing economic competitiveness; supporting
existing communities through strategies like transit-oriented, mixed-use development and
land recycling; coordinating and leveraging federal policies and investment; and
enhancing unique communities through healthy, safe, and walkable neighborhoods
(Partnership for Sustainable Communities, 2012).
Missing from these discussions is FEMA, the principal agency mandated by
Congress to handle recovery efforts. This agency also administers the National Flood
Insurance Program, pre-disaster mitigation grants, and the Hazard Mitigation Grant
Program funds available post-disaster. FEMA oversees the development and approval of
state and local hazard mitigation plans under the Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000 (Sun,
2011).
The criticism of Smart Growth in Dumb Places asserts that redevelopment in
disaster prone areas "is the antithesis of true sustainability," a poignant point considering
one in three of Smart Growth developments is exposed to flood hazards (Sun, 2011 , p.
2159). During an emergency, FEMA and other agencies underwrite 75% of the costs for
infrastructure rebuilding and flood insurance for residences. The unintended consequence
of federal intervention is that local communities will allow developments to occur in the

..

belief that the federal government will underwrite the expensive recovery (Lindell,
Prater, & Perry, 2006). It can also lead to more expensive buildings. More than 200
federal, state, and local government agencies now require Leadership in Energy and
Environmental Design, or LEED, certifications of buildings, a point-based rating system
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that is awarded by the nonprofit U.S. Green Building Council. The council of architects,
engineers, builders, and suppliers make up 89% of the voting membership, and only 1%
consists of environmental nonprofits. Using the environmental prestige, more firms are
entering green construction as noted by the jump from $3 billion in 2005 to an expected
$122 billion in 2015, up 4,000% (Frank, 2012). The town of Greensburg hired Kansas
City, Missouri-based BNIM Architects immediately after the storm for about $1 million.
Although buildings have been vastly more expensive to build due to the increased
construction costs, by pursuing LEED certification and the city-wide initiative for
sustainable design, 13 buildings save a total of $200,000 per year in energy costs (NREL,
2012a).
In the immediate aftermath of the 2007 tornado, there were two schools of
thought: One group led by a former mayor wanted to rebuild quickly, while the
prevailing majority preferred building green and meeting LEED certification. Learning
from the Hurricane Katrina response catastrophe, FEMA was very open to
recommendations, supporting the town' s green redevelopment plan. The 81 members
who crafted the Greensburg Sustainable Comprehensive Plan convinced the town to push
for 100 % of government buildings to meet LEED Platinum Standards (Smith &
Cartlidge, 2011 ). The plan resulted in a slower recovery, with 20% higher building costs.
The commercial retail strip took more than three years to build. A 15-bed hospital took
about 30 months to build. Residents were left to shop for groceries and pharmaceuticals
at the nearest town, some 30 miles away (Smith & Cartlidge, 2011). An average
Greensburg home was valued at $46,500 prior to the storm, but the changes to energy
efficiency pushed them to $120,000. Nearly two years after the storm, less than 200
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building permits were issued, a key indicator of disaster recovery. At that rate, it will take
eight years to reach pre-tornado population (Paul & Che, 201 1).
The Greensburg Sustainable Comprehensive Plan was a very broad diagram for
rebuilding that, at the time, may have appeared quite extensive and quite inclusive. From
all indications, no one was identified as an economic developer. The Comprehensive
Plan's optimistic tone took on many of the broadly connected economic goals and
objectives used by the urban planning profession: where new businesses and industries
should be encouraged; how public investment in infrastructure could induce private
investment; what kind of new businesses and industries should be promoted; and specific
recruitment efforts (City of Greensburg, 2008). In general, urban planning goals were
liberal, and they happened to mirror what was written in the city's sustainable plan, and
later used in FEMA disaster recovery documents:
Goal 1: Seek to increase employment opportunities and raise local incomes.
Goal 2: Attempt to diversify the local economic base by attracting new retail
stores and manufacturing firms, while encouraging and facilitating the expansion of
existing firms in the community.
Goal 3: Improve the mix of businesses on Main Street. Encourage new industries
to locate in the industrial park at the south end of town.
Goal 4: Expand the local property tax base through increased economic
development.
Goal 5: Obtain state or federal grants to improve local sewer and water systems in
conjunction with the creation of a local industrial park.
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Goal 6: Establish a low-interest Joan pool with the help of local banks and
businesses to aid in financing the start-up or expansion of local businesses.
Goal 7: Establish a non-profit economic development corporation to recruit
prospective new businesses (Daniels, Keller, & Lapping, 1988).
These goals, generally speaking, do not easily translate into practical terms of
success and failure, and since there is no single means of assessing the economic metrics
of a healthy economy, the conclusion is much trickier. Scholars argue over the best
methods of gauging whether local economic development is growing, stagnant, or in
decline. Economic indicators remove the politics and ambiguity, giving several key
figures something to ponder. For the public, an idea as to whether there is value; for
financial institutions, an ideas as to whether to continue or consider investing; and for
public officials, ideas as to whether to create opportunities to improve the programs.

Figure 5. Remnants of the 2007 Tornado in 2013 Greensburg (photo by David E. Leiva).
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Figure 6. The Empty Greensburg Business Park (photo by David E. Leiva).
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CHAPTER III
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY
Introduction
This research project will use the case study methodology in order to explore the
multi-perspectives with the intention of explaining the complexity of green economic
development through the lens of Greensburg, a small isolated town in western Kansas
that chose to rebuild in a costly, though eco-friendly manner. Because it is such a unique
situation, with so many actors and subplots, the case study methodology is the most
appropriate to gather a comprehensive pictur_e of how it came to be. Through multiple
sources, including documentation, City Council minutes, interviews, direct observation,
and the city' s financial statements from 2006 to 2012, the economic metrics defined by
Greensburg will be analyzed to determine if the initial goals set out by stakeholders were
met within the five year timeframe defined in the city' s Sustainable Master Plan (Yin,
1994). The interviews in this methodology could reveal opinion on events and facts to
corroborate previously gathered data, and direct observation during a site visit could
confirm previously mentioned data. These multiple sources of data "triangulate" the
evidence and increase its reliability (Tellis, 1997).
Nowhere in the federal government's studies was the possibility raised that a
complete restoration could take another 15 years. The town of Greensburg is challenged
with a slip in momentum. In 2011 , the city administrator credited with leading the rebirth,
resigned to take a position in Oklahoma. Months later, a new city administrator was fired
after two months on the job. Then, in July 2012, the city hired the Center for Innovation
in Arlington, Texas for five years at a total cost of $161 ,000, to spur economic
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development. The Center works with communities in searching and attracting technology
companies (Clement, 2012a). The new city administrator, Ed Truelove, will work to
increase business and residential recruitment over the next five years. " I see my job as
increasing population and bringing industry to town," Truelove said in July 2012 (Hanks,
2012, para. 14).
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Figure 7. The Five Towns in Kiowa County (Kansas Department of Transportation).

In the 2007 Long Term Community Recovery Plan, Greensburg officials, who
teamed up with FEMA to identify a litany of sustainable approaches and fees, adopted a
six-prong initiative targeting commercial development interest: prepare an economic
development strategy ($177,000 estimate); rebuild Downtown Greensburg ($ 1,620,000
estimate); establish business development assistance programs ($700,000 estimate);
create a business incubator ($1 ,500,000 estimate); develop a communitywide wireless
network ($88,000 estimate); and develop a US-54 corridor design plan ($90,000
estimate) (City of Greensburg, 2007).
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The first initiative consists of three parts: creation of an economic development
plan, development of a skilled workforce, and revitalization of the Chamber of
Commerce. According to the planners, this strategy would help Greensburg retain and
attract businesses, increase tourism, and foster a positive economic development attitude
in the community. Considered an important tool, the Long Term Community Recovery
Plan identified sustainable opportunities to promote businesses that incorporate
sustainable practices: target business attraction efforts toward sustainable green
businesses and industries or those that utilize sustainable practices; use a marketing plan
to highlight sustainable construction in Kiowa County; and promote eco-tourism
opportunities where possible. The plan defined a cost of $97,000 to create such an
economic development program (City of Greensburg, 2007).
The plan' s workforce development section included sustainable opportunities to
develop and provide training in sustainable building practices to help attract sustainable

green industries to Kiowa County. It also sought to train Energy Raters to evaluate
energy efficiency of construction projects. The creation of this workforce section was
expected to cost $50,000. The plan' s revitalization of the Chamber of Commerce would
need a part-time director at a cost of $30,000; this person could help develop sustainable
training and seminars for businesses (City of Greensburg, 2007).
Other key initiatives included rebuilding downtown through the use of a master
plan at a cost of $50,000. It defines sustainable opportunities to incorporate low
maintenance and native vegetation in downtown design; to use grey water irrigation
system for watering vegetation; to provide connections between important downtown
elements by incorporating biking and walking paths; to include green elements within the
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design guidelines to establish minimum standards; and to use solar power as a source for
street lighting.
A year later, the town' s comprehensive plan was modified to suggest leveraging
the newfound notoriety Greensburg was receiving as an economic development tool,
paying particular attention to attracting green businesses and allocating space for green
start-ups at a business incubator (City of Greensburg, 2008). An important factor for
Greensburg was to set high building standards and attract new building economies that
support the community' s goals. By developing new sustainable materials and
technologies, rural communities also have the potential to attract scientific researchers
and entrepreneurial manufacturers. The training and exploration of skilled craftsmen
using sustainable materials could lead to exportable skill sets (City of Greensburg, 2008).
Problem and Purpose Overview
Even as Greensburg today struggles to return to its pre-storm population and
economic condition, the federal government and a host of others continue to champion
the merits of green economic development. These groups originally backed the town's
change. However, in 2009, the Federal Emergency Management Agency announced it
would end its housing program after pumping nearly $100 million in aid for clean-up
costs, housing assistance, uninsured losses, and rebuilding critical infrastructure (FEMA,
2009). Whether future communities will have access to this much funding is unknown
and probably unlikely given the current state of fiscal affairs in this country. The
Greensburg case is a disturbing precedent for the federal government tying up federal
recovery dollars with green economic development approaches (NREL, 2012b). None of
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the original members of the Recovery Plan appeared to ask more fundamental questions
of the foundation of financial sustainability of this plan. Billman (2009) writes:
Energy affects all aspects of a community, and that is abundantly apparent when
rebuilding after a disaster. Greensburg's unique situation of near-total destruction
represented an opportunity to try alternative energy solutions on a communitywide scale, for which there are few precedents in the world. Pursuing a wide
range of new energy solutions throughout the city has placed Greensburg in a
leadership position not only among Kansas communities but also among
communities throughout the United States and the world. In addition, becoming
known as a leader in sustainable development may add to Greensburg's economic
competitiveness and allow the community to take advantage of the upsurge of
interest in green initiatives from many businesses and surrounding communities.
We hope these efforts in Greensburg, Kansas, will inspire and assist other
communities facing similar challenges. (Billman, 2009, p. 55)
Research Question
Five years later, how well does Greensburg, Kansas, serve as a national model of
green economic development as a post-disaster recovery approach in the context of a
global market economy?
Research Hypotheses
Hypothesis 1
The city of Greensburg and Kiowa County will regain its population as projected
by the designers of the Greensburg comprehensive sustainable plan evidenced by sales
tax increases.
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Hypothesis 2
The city of Greensburg and Kiowa County will experience sustained housing
prices for newly built environmentally-friendly homes from people moving into the city.

Hypothesis 3
The town of Greensburg will reach energy goals that save 30-40 % on its
Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design (LEED-rated) public buildings
compared to typical buildings of similar size, which will result in lower utility and water
costs over the five-year period.

Hypothesis 4
Neighboring cities and counties will experience some minor declines to their
financial health when the Greensburg population moves back to Greensburg.
Population and Sample
Greensburg is the county seat of Kiowa County. There are 105 counties in
Kansas, with a total population of2.9 million people (U.S. Census, 2013). The six
contiguous counties to Kiowa County are Pratt, Barber, Comanche, Edwards, Ford, and
Clark Counties.
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Data Collection and Instrumentation
The data collected from the Institute for Policy and Social Research at The
University of Kansas assisted greatly in the quantitative analysis of the quality ofliving
in comparing Kiowa County to the six contiguous counties. The indicators offer the most
objective synopsis of quantitative measures carried annually. Taken from the Kansas
Statistical Abstract, the county profiles offer an opportunity to compare counties within
the state of Kansas to create an overall grade of the economy, offering historical data in
the process. In order to reach the overall grade, per capita market income, unemployment
ratio, labor force-to-total population ratio, per capita transfer payments-to-per capita
market income ratio, and population change were measured. The university's research
arm indicated that the idea was derived from a 2004 EDA report that outlined different
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ways of measuring economic distress (EDA, 2004). Although EDA contributed several
million dollars to rebuild Main Street, it might have been more helpful to point out the
report the agency had commissioned in 2004 that characterized the 400 counties
nationwide, which had been in a perpetual state of distress for four decades. They tended
to have similar problems oflow income, high unemployment rates, low labor-force
participation rates, and high dependency on transfer income. Several hundred other
counties were no better off, sitting in the cradle of "economic insecurity and stagnation"
(EDA, 2004, p. 159). These communities tended to be small, geographically isolated,
agricultural economies with little else in term~ of a diverse economy. Kiowa County was
one of them. The EDA report noted the following:
The problems faced by such communities include but also extend
significantly beyond the need for infrastructure to attract private-sector
business investment. Many communities lack more basic elements,
including a location conducive to integration with wider economic
systems, a competitive natural advantage, effective civic capacity,
adequate housing and municipal services, and effective schools. In many
ways, these communities can be described as lacking elements that would
make them "development ready." (EDA, 2004, p. I 59)
The Overall Economic Health Index adapted by the University of Kansas sought
to express the degree to which the experience of individual counties deviates from
national norms.
For the purpose of calculating Per Capita Market Income Index market income is
defined as a total personal income minus personal current transfer receipts. The U.S. per
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capita market income is in the denominator while the state PCMI in the numerator. A
county with a higher PCMI than the U.S . average indicates it is healthier than the national
average. This supports Hypothesis 1.
PCMI =

(Total Personal Income - Transfer Receipts)
Total Population

Indicator 1 =

PCMI for County
U.S. PCMI

For the purpose of calculating Unemployment Rate Index, the local
unemployment rate is compared to the nation' s rate. A county with a lower
unemployment rate than the nation' s rate would be given a higher score indicating a
greater number of people working in the county as compared to the nation. This supports
Hypothesis 1.
Unemployment Rate =

U.S. Unemployment Rate
County Unemployment Rate

Indicator 2= Unemployment Ratio x 100
For the purpose of calculating Labor Force-to-Total Population Ratio Index, the
percent of an area' s population not in the labor force is compared to the national average.
A healthy LTFP score would indicate that there are not as many people in a household
dependent on the labor of others to support them. This supports Hypothesis 1.
LFTP =

Indicator 3 =

(Total County Population - Civilian Labor Force in County)
Total County Population
U.S. Labor Force Total Population
County Labor Force Total Population

For the purpose of calculating Per Capita Transfer Payments-to-Per Capita

Market Income Ratio Index, external sources of unearned income are calculated against
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the Per Capita Market Income Index (Indicator 1). High amounts of this indicator are
given lower scores because it indicates that the household income is tied to a subsidy, a
form of public welfare. This supports Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2.
Per Capita Transfer Payments
Per Capita Market Income Index

TPMI =

Indicator 4 =

U.S. TPMI Ratio
County TPMI Ratio

For the purpose of calculating Population Change Index, 10 classes of population
density for counties gauge an area' s population change as compared to the average
change for peer areas. This supports Hypothesis 1, Hypothesis 2, and Hypothesis 4.

PCI = Local Percent Population Change - Average Percent Population Change for Peer Group
Average Percent Population Change for Peer Group
Positive:

100 + PCI

Negative:

100 - PCI

County Peer Groups:

(1) Less than 5
(2)5to10
(3) 10 to 20
(4) 20 to 40
(5) 40 to 80
(6) 80 to 160
(7) 160 to 320
(8) 320 to 640
(9) 640 to 1280
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(10) Equal or greater than 1280
A survey was created to further understand local perception on the overall success
of the sustainability plan, which would answer Hypotheses 1, 2, and 3. Using an 11-point
set of economic indicators designed by three college professors for the International City
Managers Association, the activities and functions of economic activity should be able to
be extracted (Kotval, Mullin, & Murray, 2002).
A. Tax Base
1. Did green development and accompanying strategies directly help to
expand the tax base?
2. Will this indirectly help to expand the tax base?
3. Will it help directly maintain the tax base?
4. Will this indirectly maintain the tax base?
B. Jobs Maintained and Generated
1. Will this directly result in new jobs?
2. Will this indirectly result in new jobs?
3. Will this directly save jobs?
4. Will this indirectly save jobs?
5. Will this generate construction jobs?
6. Will this help the unemployed?
C. Plant Investment
1. Will this result in the building of a new plant or the expansion of an
existing facility?
2. Will this result in new jobs or job retention?
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3. Will this add tax revenues to the community?
4. Will this strengthen an industrial cluster or bring a new technology to the
community?
5. Will the unemployed, underemployed, or displaced workers be hired?
D. Loans Leveraged
1. Did the loan contribute to obtaining a conventional loan?
2. Did the loan stimulate the creation of a new company?
3. Did the loan stimulate the attraction or retention of a company?
4. Did the loan contribute to the creation of new jobs or the retention of
existing jobs?
5. Did the loan revitalize a building and, therefore, contribute to #2, #3, or #4
above?
E. Improved Corporate Performance
1. Did the investments result in improved corporate performance?
2. Did the investment indirectly contribute to "linked" firms moving to or
staying in the area?
3. Did the investment stimulate the creation of new markets, or new
products?
F. Revitalized Properties
1. Did the investment result in a vacant building being occupied?
2. Did the investment result in companies and jobs being gained or
retained because of the investment?
3. Is the property on a solid financial footing?
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4. Is the building contributing tax revenues to the community?
G. Non-Traditional Jobs Gained
1. Did the investment provide jobs for minorities, women, new Americans,
the chronically unemployed, and/or the displaced worker?
2. Did the investment provide jobs for the above workers that at least
matched the prevailing wages in the community?
3. Did the investment provide jobs that provided at least basic medical
insurance?
H. Land Assembly
1. Did the investment result in parcels that could not previously be developed
becoming marketable?
2. Did the investment stimulate new construction, new or retained jobs,
and/or new or retained tax revenue?
I.

Inventions and Licenses
1. Did the investments result in bringing new inventions, licenses, or
products to market?

J. Expansion of Infrastructure Capacity
1. Did the investment result in the expansion of infrastructure capacity?
2. What was the immediate return on investment?
3. What will the investment result in at build-out?
Additionally, a comparison between Greensburg pre-tornado data points to the
same points five years later should serve as the foundation for the more pragmatic
approach of determining how well Greensburg has recovered. These data points are
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commonly used by metropolitan economic development organizations (Greater
Oklahoma City Partnership, 2012).
The following areas would give a good indication of recovery for Greensburg and
answer Hypotheses 1 and 2. They include:
1. Total population
2. Employment
3. Nonfarm employment

4. Average weekly earnings
5. Building permits
6. Residential sales
7. Federal Housing Finance Authority House Price Index
8. Apartment rent rates
9. Consumer Price Index
10. Major airport traffic
11 . Tourism
12. Commercial real estate
13. ACCRA Cost of Living Index
14. Sales tax receipts
Semi-Structured Personal Interviews
Much of the data for this research was available in the city' s financial statements.
What could not be quantified through the archived data are the perceptions of Greensburg
residents. To supplement the historical data, semi-structured interviews are to be
conducted for this study - four of them during the visit - with individuals who were

51

recognized to have played critical roles in the community. If possible, it would be best to
speak with members of the Greensburg Sustainable Comprehensive Master Plan who
were acknowledged in the August 2008 document. Another set of questions were
designed for key stakeholders whom were part of the planning process from the
beginning. The questions were framed where only top decision makers could reply with
any serious credibility. The interviews were then to be coded and searched for repeated
idea to discover budding themes. The interviews were partly pre-arranged through City
Hall officials. They were not confidential. The questions would consist of the following:
1. The experts who came here said the city's population would return to its prestorm count by 2012. Any comments?
2. Does green economic development work?
3. Do you think out-of-town professionals misrepresented themselves to local
residents?
4. Why do you believe more universities did not stay involved beyond the first
couple of years?
5. When was the last time you saw celebrities who made regular appearances
early on, such as Leonardo DiCaprio and the owners of Ben & Jerry's?
6. Do you believe out-of-town experts took advantage of the city's limited
expertise?
7. What are your thoughts on the activities of Greensburg GreenTown?
8. What is the disposition of the Meadowlark House?
9. Do you believe the national media purposely avoids portraying Greensburg as
a town that has not lived up to the expectations?
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10. Do some visitors come here surprised to learn that a level of rebuilding and
restoration continues?
11 . Is the Greensburg of today worthy of emulation - its economy, its social
structure, and its way forward?
12. You are very busy with all of your assigned jobs. How did you come to do it
all?
13. What data is available on rental vacancies?
14. Are other researchers you speak with interested in the financial health of the
city five years after the storm?
15. Are the expectations of Greensburg living green too high?
16. Are there any building permit figures prior to the storm?
17. Knowing how this would end up five years later, do you believe the
Greensburg leadership would make changes to the recovery plan?
18. The rental market is a unique situation in Greensburg. Can you please
explain?
19. In terms of the numbers, would you say there are more or less rentals since the
storm?
· 20. Can you elaborate on the residential phenomenon? Land detection studies
indicate that lots are bigger with fewer homes, homes are more expensive.
How does that translate to you as a banker?
21. Would you say it is more expensive to live in Greensburg than any other part
of Kiowa County?
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22. How much of the success or failure of Greensburg do you attribute to green
economic development?
23. Are the tax rolls, empty lots, and sparse activity troublesome to you? Do you
expect this to change in the future?
24. What role does the city' s 2008 comprehensive plan play in terms of economic
development?
25. Can you point me to some documents that might help explain the direction
that the town is now going to develop?
26. Do you believe that the urban planner is best equipped to deal with long-term
recovery?
27. Is there anything that disappoints you, outside of jobs, things that didn' t quite
pan out?
28. How did someone assume that the population would be restored in five years?
29. Do you believe that economic development and business attraction played a
secondary role to housing and infrastructure building?
30. Are city leaders or civic leaders revisiting the comprehensive plan written five
years ago?
The data was analyzed using Thematic Analysis, searching for similar thoughts by
different people interviewed. After transcribing the interviews, the responses were read
and placed into initial coding. After being initially identified and labeled during the initial
coding, the reoccurring idea helped locate the themes. The ideas started out more
numerous than anticipated, and it made it slightly more difficult that every question was
not asked of each person (Braun & Clarke, 2006). Because there were so few interviews,
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categories were reached more easily, and the larger themes located. The repeating ideas
were organized and used as a quote for emphasis where possible (Lofland & Lofland,
1995).
Secondary Research Data Collection
Academic journals were used to gather the literature written about Greensburg
and Kiowa County following the storm. This led to some informal interviews with
authors from different disciplines to gather insight. Textbooks on Greensburg were
unavailable. Newspaper articles and magazine stories were available online. They
provided useful insight to understanding the mood of the town's people. Most useful
were the articles written by Kansas-based publications, including the Kiowa County

Signal, Hutchison News, Pratt Tribune, and to a lesser extent, the Kansas Daily Star. One
limitation is that many of the papers lacked extensive digital libraries.
Analysis of the city's financial statements from 2006 to 2012 offered the most
comprehensive picture of the city's economic health. These numbers have been audited
and submitted to the county and state of Kansas as required under state law. Using
financial statements must take into account two other phenomena: the national business
cycle and any structural shift in the economy regionally, statewide, and nationally
(Blakely & Leigh, 2010). While generally compared to other similar towns, Greensburg's
finances were unique because no other town in the United States had rebuilt completely
as a green city. By using a five-year trend, some evidence might be readily identifiable.
However, the next milestone study should include at least 10 years. Trying to revisit
Greensburg earlier than 2000 only assisted with historical context, but it did little for the
analysis.
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CHAPTER IV
ANALYSIS OF DATA
Introduction
While most of the data that could be garnered came from the city's financial
statements from 2005 through 2012, efforts were made to capture other aspects of the
local economy. That proved difficult because it required intimate knowledge and
expertise to decipher. The town of Greensburg had neither the expertise nor knowledge
base to make some of the decisions it made, a major reason experts from outside the area
were consulted. The data is presented first quantitatively, and where possible, interviews
are intermingled to provide context to some of the decisions. The mayor and city
administrator did not respond to specific questions that would have been within their
purview. As a result, the I I-point set of economic indicators designed for the
International City Managers Association were not answered. The town ' s size made it
difficult to find data commonly used by metropolitan economic development
organizations, such as the Greater Oklahoma City Partnership, because third-parties do
not track small towns. Therefore, a baseline or comparables could not be determined.
Research Questions and Associated Hypotheses
The research question and four hypotheses were intended to expand the literature.
Very little information was focused on the state of the economy and predictions for its
future. Perhaps researchers were awaiting a decade to get some inkling as to its condition.
Such a pause was unnecessary to get a snapshot of the current states. As the emergency
management literature acknowledges that such recovery could take up to 20 years or
1,000 weeks, five years seemed to be an appropriate check of the pulse.
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Analysis of Data
Research Question 1 - Five y ears later, how well does Greensburg, Kansas, serve
as a national model ofgreen economic development as a post-disaster recovery approach
in the context ofa global market economy? The answer to this question is elusive. In

2009, the U.S. Department of Energy said economic opportunities would open once a
commitment to greener choices was made. A report from the federal agency said "Green
recovery can set a new focal point for economic development, place emphasis on new
green-collar jobs, and improve your community's image, which in turn, can attract
businesses and residents" (DOE, 2009, p. 3). That did not occur. As could be expected,
the amount of cash peaked in 2008 with a windfall of $6.2 million in tornado insurance
after the storm. However, the city's cash has since fallen significantly at a rate of 18% per
year from its 2008 peak of $1 1.4 million.
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Since the tornado that destroyed Greensburg in 2007, the city has experienced
similar downward trends in local sales and vehicle taxes that bring them closer to prestorm levels. Meanwhile, the city's ad valorem taxes have skyrocketed during the same
period. Christy Pyatt, the city clerk at the City of Greensburg, has observed Greensburg' s
rise since the tornado. She started working three weeks before the tornado and still works
there. Pyatt said the Neighborhood Revitalization program, one of the few incentives
available from the county, continues to be renewed. The end date depends on the
applicant, she said, and not all buildings are included in the revitalization. Some residents
did not abide by the rules that they apply and be approved by the county prior to
beginning construction. Other residents lost their status because they neglected to pay
their taxes at the appropriate times. Most of the building took place in 2008 and 2009 and
should start ending in 2018 and 2019. A sliding scale determines the percentage of return
for any given year during that 10 year process, with eventually the city and county
receiving its maximum amount, she said (C. Pyatt, personal communication, April 15,
2013).
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Figure 11. Annual Totals of Ad Valorem Tax, Local Sales Tax, & Vehicle Tax 20052012. "City of Greensburg, Kansas Financial Statements with Independent Auditor' s
Report," City of Greensburg. 2005-2012.

The 2008 plan believed that the sustainability of Greensburg relied on its ability
to bring in new high-quality jobs due to the competitive advantage it would have as a
result of the city' s reinvention, due to the clustering of sustainable amenities, and
opportunities. The report was bright:
Crafts people, manufacturing, research, and product design are all business types
that could emerge alongside a shift toward sustainable thinking. Coordinating and
stimulating these business types will create healthy commerce and pay dividends
toward the long-term economic health of the region. A strong economy will also
protect the current reinvestment and add momentum to the vision of a completely
rebuilt community. (City of Greensburg, 2008, p. 64)
The civilian labor force has remained flat in Kiowa County matching the
population' s steady decline. At this time, it does not appear that the sustainable-type jobs
have materialized. In an interview in September 2012, Erica Goodman, a member of the
City Council and a local business owner, said she would prefer not to be in the position to
simply accept any business that had an interest in moving into Greensburg if they were
not committed to the city' s green principles. Specifically, she did not want an
incompatible company moving into the city' s industrial park simply to occupy it (E.
Goodman, personal communication, October 20, 2012). In the July 2013 City Council
minutes, the city administrator cautioned that it can take at least three years for a business
to establish itself in a new location such as Greensburg (City of Greensburg, 2013).
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Figure 13. Establishments Total County Business Patterns 1990, 2000, 2007-2010.
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For the purpose of calculating the overall county Economic Health Index, the
average of the five indicators is given equal weight. Along with Kiowa County, the six
contiguous counties bordering it were measured with the scoring falling into five
categories. Kiowa County was given a (-56), or "Very Poor Economic Health" grade,
largely in part, because its population change indicator is (-846), drawing down the
average. The population loss can be directly attributed to the city of Greensburg, which
lost half of its 2000 population of 1,500 after the storm. They have not returned (see
Table 1).
Hypothesis 1 - The city ofGreensburg and Kiowa County will regain its population as
projected by the designers of the Greensburg comprehensive sustainable plan and
evidenced by sales tax increases.

The figures have not materialized as expected. In fact, they have not come
anywhere near the projected population return. One year after the 2007 tornado, the fullyendorsed Greensburg plan released in May 2008 was very clear:

Based on projections by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA),
the City of Greensburg should experience a steady increase in population with a
reasonable expectation of reaching the pre-disaster population within five years.
The projected return rate of the Greensburg population is based on the level of
damage and community response, and shows a 50% recovery of the former
population in the next 18 months, 75% recovery in three years and l 00 % in five
years (City of Greensburg, 2008, p. 17).
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Table 1
Economic Health Indicators by County 2012

County

Overall
Economic
Health

Per
Unemployment
Capita Ratio
Market
Income

Labor
Force-toTotal
Population
Ratio

Per Capita
Transfer
Paymentsto-Per
Capita
Market
Income
Ratio

Population
Change

Kiowa

(-56)

104

238

128

94

(-846)

Edwards

19

139

220

128

127

(-517)

Pratt

87

107

196

139

97

(-105)

Barber

39

100

232

120

90

348

Clark

7

80

238

123

73

(-477)

Ford

138

80

220

120

120

151

Note. (x<85) Very Poor Economic Health; (85-95) Poor Economic Health; (95-105) Average Economic Health; ( 105- 115) Good
Economic Health; (x> 115) Very Good Economic Health. August 31 , 2012, Kansas County Profile Report, The University of Kansas
Institute for Policy & Social Research. Adapted with permission of the author.

Patrick Clement, 33, served as the editor of the weekly Kiowa County Signal, the
town's lone newspaper, for nearly two years. He first arrived in town from Los Angeles
as part of the television production team from the Discovery Channel that was making a
documentary-style reality show of the town that aired on Planet Green. After returning to
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California, he moved back to Greensburg. His position gave him a daily take on life in
Greensburg.
"On a more practical level, green industry is founded and created by young
professionals and they are not going to move to Greensburg," he said in an interview.
" Why would they move to Greensburg where there's no Starbucks? There' s no private
school for their children? It's windy, dusty and dirty" (P. Clement, Personal
communication, April 16, 2013).
Recognizing that Kiowa County had also decreased in population, the next
question was whether Kiowa County was alone in this phenomenon. It was not. With
Dodge City, the major town only 45 miles away to the west, and Pratt, a city about 25
miles east, it was possible that many of the residents simply moved to these different
counties. While not limited to only these two counties, it would not be inconceivable that
former Greensburg residents did go to other communities within the region, such as the
city of Wichita located about 100 miles east. With the exception of Ford and Pratt
counties, the other counties have experienced population loss. Kiowa County has lost
31 % of its population, the most of the seven counties.
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Figure 14. Population of Kiowa County and Surrounding Counties from 1990, 2000,
2010 and Estimate 2012. August 31 , 2012, Kansas County Profile Report, The University
of Kansas Institute for Policy & Social Research. Adapted with permission of the author.
The University of Kansas Institute for Policy and Social Research Economic
Health Index gave much weight to population. Projections for the next two decades do
not bode well for many of these counties, including Kiowa County.
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Figure 15. Population of Kiowa County and Surrounding Counties with Estimates
Through 2040. "Projected Population," August 31, 2012, Kansas County Profile Report,
The University of Kansas Institute for Policy & Social Research. Adapted with
permission of the author.

These projections do not match up with the expectations produced in the 2008
sustainable plan for Kiowa County. With the exception of Clark County, all of the
contiguous counties are expected to lose population over the course of the next three
decades. Kiowa County's total population would be smaller than the current population
of its county seat, Greensburg, according to the projections.
Where Greensburg' s population will be in 20 years is a question of much debate
and a favorite topic of prognostication around town. Based on the research
gathered by the planning team and the indication of new industries taking an
interest in Greensburg's sustainability goals, we believe that Greensburg can
become one of the few rural communities able to gradually increase its
population. To accomplish steady growth, city officials, county agencies, and the
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many active citizen groups will have to continue their intensive reconstruction
and recruitment efforts. Most importantly, when making rebuilding decision, it
will be critical to consider the impact of the project on the citizens of Greensburg
today, the citizens that will be recruited to town, and the next generation of
Greensburg residents. (City of Greensburg, 2008, p. 17)
Hypothesis 2 - The city of Greensburg and Kiowa County will experience sustained
housing prices for newly built environmentally-friend~y homes from people moving into
the city.
After escalating, housing prices did not fall from the lack of demand for the more
expensive environmentally-friendly built homes in the city of Greensburg and Kiowa
County.
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Figure 16. Impact of a Decrease in Supply on the Kiowa County Market Equilibrium.

The Longer Term Community Recovery Plan expected a challenge to building
green because the vast majority of the homeowners - nearly 75% - were underinsured.
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For its estimates, the values were placed at $50,000, creating a gap of $70,000 to replace
a $120,000 home of 1,300 square feet with three bedrooms and two baths. Another
$20,000 was expected to be spent to clean up the site and basement work for a total of
$140,000. However, sources to help offset the expenses were expected to come from state
low-income assistance and insurance proceeds for a total of $50,000. The total cost to
replace all of the housing was expected to run between $37 million and $53 million (City
of Greensburg, 2007).
Since 2000, Kiowa County has experienced the highest increase in median value
of owner-occupied homes - up 70% - compared ~o the other congruous counties. Barber
and Edward counties had 59% and 51 % increases, respectively, while Ford County had
the smallest increase during that 10-year span, 20%.
The plan did acknowledge there would be significant challenges such as the
increased costs as a result of the limited number of area contractors with sustainable
design experience, housing available for out-of-town contractors, limited amount of
sustainable materials that could be purchased locally, and the pent up demand to move
quickly (City of Greensburg, 2008).
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Figurel7. Median Value of Owner-Occupied Housing Units by County 1990, 2000,
2009, 2010. August 31, 2012, Kansas County Profile Report, The University of Kansas
Institute for Policy & Social Research. Adapted with permission of the author.
From 1990 until 2010, the number of owner-occupied homes has dropped in
Kiowa County. The decrease in the supply of homes has increased the market price of
homes in the county, which has resulted in a decrease in quantity demand. With the
exception of the period immediately after the storm, prices have not increased as a result
of demand. Intuitively, had the decrease in demand been the catalyst for the decrease in
price then the demand for quantity supplied would have decreased. All of the seven
contiguous counties had similar business establishment trends. However, (Figure 12) in
Greensburg, the county seat of Kiowa County, the number of permits dropped
significantly. This finding was consistent (Hagelmann, Connolly, Zavar, & Dahal, 2012)
in that nearly one-third of businesses failed after the storm, and one-third moved to
another location to either take advantage oflower costs or mobility corridors. Hagelman
(2012) purchased detailed business profiles from a commercial vendor to have a frozen
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moment of business activity. It resulted in a land detection analysis for the period of
2007-2010. This research paper attempted to update those land detection findings but
used data from the Kiowa County Appraisers Office. According to the change detection,
the City of Greensburg' s rezoning caused 183 acres to be placed into urban use from its
pre-storm nonuse. Meanwhile, only 18 acres that were once urban became vegetated.
Other parts of the city experienced no change.
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Figure 18. Change Detection of Greensburg from 2006-2012 (Cartography by James
Dickens) " One-Meter Change Detection Greensburg, Kansas 2006-2012, Kiowa County
Appraisers Office, 2006 & 2012 NAIP Color Infrared Image courtesy of USDA-FSA
Aerial Photography Field Office. April 2013.

This finding indicated that the Smart Growth principles that underline
sustainability did not achieve their intended objective of creating density and also
increased the costs. Six years after the tornado destroyed 95% of Greensburg, the city
experienced a rebuilding surge of homes valued at more than $100,000 even though lots
became bigger and homes became more expensive.
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Thomas Corns, the banker, gave his own account of how the larger lots occurred.
For him, it was about maintaining his property value. He had a home built in the early
1960s that was not completely destroyed by the tornado. After spending "enough money
on it to tear it down and have it rebuilt again," he opted to buy the neighbor' s lot and the
lot across the alley (T. Corns, Personal communication, April 15, 2013 ). "They were
going to put a trailer there, and I bought that lot to control the neighborhood," he said. " I
have no use for one of the lots. Whenever I can find someone who will build a permanent
stick built house, I will be glad to sell it" (T. Corns, Personal communication, April 15,
2013).
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Figu.re 19. Building Permits in Greensburg.

Pyatt, the city clerk, said appraisals after the tornado were significantly higher
than pre-tornado because everything was new, many built bigger, and there were no
comparable sales. Every five years, the county appraiser reassesses the homes, which has
resulted in some appraisals falling. Still, the services provided by the county and city are
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covered by taxes. "We have a much smaller tax base than pre-tornado," she said.
"Between rising costs and the lower tax base the county has had to raise taxes 3% to
cover their costs" (C. Pyatt, Personal communication, October 14, 2013).
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Figu,re 20. Parcel Value & Property Zones in Greensburg 2013 (Cartography by James
Dickens) Kiowa County Appraisers Office, 2006 & 2012 NAIP Color Infrared Image
courtesy of USDA-FSA Aerial Photography Field Office. April 2013.

The Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City captures the Seriously Delinquent
Mortgages (90 or more days past due or in foreclosure) every quarter, an economic
indicator that expresses the economic distress of the area. Since the 2°d quarter of 2011,
more than 8% of all mortgages in Kiowa County were either past due by 90 days or
already in foreclosure, according to the Kansas City branch, the consistently highest
among the seven congruous counties. Should the Federal Open Market Committee raise
the Federal Funds Rate, it would have a detrimental impact on Greensburg home owners
already unable to pay existing mortgages, as banks would raise their prime rate making it
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more costly to purchase those homes on the market. The market would be depressed
further.
Clement, the editor, said many people could not live in Greensburg because there
were no homes, but the pent up demand forced properties in neighboring cities to
increase in asking price, and, as a result, their tax values. Faced with purchasing an older
home at higher prices, residents returned and built.
"Either way, you are going to be in debt, but if you are going to rebuild in
Greensburg, at least, it will be a brand new house. That' s why people build in Greensburg
and they're upside down, and they're cool with i~," Clement said (P. Clement, Personal
communication, April 16, 2013). "Now that's a heightened market in a real short time.
Those prices have begun to come down."
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Figu.re 21. Seriously Delinquent Mortgages by County (90 or More Days Past Due or In
Foreclosure) from 2nd Qtr 2011 to 2nd Qtr 2013. "Seriously Delinquent Rates by County,"
Lender Processing Services, Inc. , Consumer Credit Report Kansas, Federal Reserve Bank
of Kansas City. 2nd Quarter 2013. 1st Quarter 2013 . 4th Quarter 2012. 3rd Quarter 2012.
2nd Quarter 2012. 1st Quarter 2012. 4th Quarter 2011. 3rd Quarter 2011. 2nd Quarter 2011.
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A final point on banks should be made here. From 2007-20 11 , the amount of bank
deposits in Kiowa County has dropped 15% while the banks in the other six contiguous
counties have experienced an increase during the same period. An explanation for this is
unknown, but one could surmise that insurance proceeds have fallen, residents who no
longer live in Greensburg deposit their money in local banks, and expenses have
increased.
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Figure 22. Bank Deposits($) in Millions by County, 2000, 2007-2011 . "Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation, Data Book, Operating Banks and Branches," August 31, 2012,
Kansas County Profile Report, The University of Kansas Institute for Policy & Social
Research. Adapted with permission of the author.

Hypothesis 3- The town ofGreensburg will reach energy goals that save 30-40% on its
Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design (LEED-rated) public buildings
compared to typical buildings of comparable size, which will result in lower utility and
water sales over the five-year period.
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All of the city' s public buildings met their energy goals, and in some cases, they
exceeded the goals of 42% energy savings. For instance, the 5.4.7 Arts Center saved 70%
compared to a typical building. The business incubator saved 71% compared to a
comparable building of its size. The K-12 school had 72% savings, while City Hall had
65% savings compared to buildings of comparable size (NREL, 2012).
The city collects fees on utilities. Although the city' s population has dropped
significantly, the residential and commercial use of water and electricity has not subsided.
With the exception of the year after the tornado, fees collected in these two accounts have
remained consistent. Even with fewer residents in Greensburg, the water utility sales
climbed above pre-storm levels. Given the emphasis on managing all resources, an
explanation for the water increases is unknown.
In one potential bright spot, electricity utility sales have experienced a 17%
decline since the 2007 storm, which could imply that the savings projected by the NREL
is occurring (see Table 2). One explanation could be in the "Notes to Financial
Statements" (City of Greensburg, 2012) that states the Series 2001 Electric Utility
System is among the city's long-term debt. The filings state that in 2006, the system
serviced 924 customers, and in 2012, it serviced 558 customers (see Table 3). While the
number of customers is down 40%, the revenue is down 70%. However, the auditors
noted that the stipulation to the rate was that net revenues of the Electric Fund should not
be less than 120% of the debt service requirement. In 201 2, the revenue was short
$59,824 (City of Greensburg, 2012).
Pyatt said several factors account for this counterintuitive occurrence. She said for
the first time in years, the city raised electric rates to keep that department " above water,"
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making the cost appear higher. Also, many of the new buildings are all electric, which
eliminates natural gas consumption, but makes for much higher electric usage and cost.
Pyatt said most of the residential buildings do not use an alternative source of power such
as solar or wind to help offset the additional electric cost. In addition, a large farm in the
city uses much electricity during harvest to run grain driers and other equipment
(C. Pyatt, Personal communication, October 14, 2013).
Table 2
Number ofCustomers Serviced by Series 2001 Electric Utility System 2006-2012
2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

924

931

296

473

537

562

558

"City of Greensburg, Kansas Financial Statements with Independent Auditor's Report," City of Greensburg, 2006-20 12.

Table 3
Net Revenue from Series 2001 Electric Utility System 2006-2012
2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

$465,123

$237,002

$254,287

$355,638

$333,384

$292,717

"City of Greensburg, Kansas Financial Statements with Independent Auditor's Report," City of Greensburg, 2006-2012.
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Figu,re 23. Annual Totals of Electric Utility Sales and Water Utility Sales 2005-2012.
" City of Greensburg, Kansas Financial Statements with Independent Auditor' s Report,"
City of Greensburg. 2005-2012. Adapted with permission of the author.

Hypothesis 4 - Neighboring cities and counties will experience some minor declines to
their financial health when the Greensburg population moves back to Greensburg.
Neighboring cities and counties did experience some minor improvements to their
financial health during the same timeframe because new residents migrated there. In the
aftermath of the storm, many people wanted to rebuild quickly so they went where they
could do it quickly, according to Pyatt, the city clerk. She said the town of Haviland now
has many of Greensburg' s former resident. Her comments were in line with the plan's
expectations. Renters, who had grown accustomed to paying $335 per month, were also
expected to be challenged by the expected costs increases (City of Greensburg, 2008b).
While not all residents were expected to return, new residents were expected. The plan
only expected a slight decline in Kiowa County' s population, while the city of
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Greensburg would be positioned "with a reasonable expectation" of pre-disaster
population. (City of Greensburg, 2008b, p. 26) So far, that has not happened. For the
seven contiguous counties, there is very little difference in the fair market rent through
this seven-year span. Compared to the much larger Pratt and Ford counties, Kiowa
County' s rent is only 15% less.
"On (Haviland's) statistics that looks huge because these were small towns and
not a lot of people were moving to or building," Pyatt said. "There wasn ' t a house to be
had in Haviland. Houses that would have sat on the market for a long time, sold very
quickly. Rentals went very quickly" (P. Pyatt, Personal communication, April 15, 2013).
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Figure 24. Fair Market Rent by County: Two Bedrooms 2005-2012. August 31 , 2012,
Kansas County Profile Report, The University of Kansas Institute for Policy & Social
Research. Adapted with permission of the author.

Other key figures that were used to analyze and hold as benchmarks included:
Tangible Assessed Valuations, Sales Tax Collections, the U.S. Bureau of Economic
Analysis Per Capita Personal Income, Percent of Population Receiving Food Stamps,
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Estimated Percentage of People in Poverty, and Sources of Personal Income. The
findings were relevant and helped frame the answers to the research question. The
valuations in Kiowa County have remained persistently high since 2007 despite the drop
in population. Sales taxes for all seven contiguous counties have increased since 1990.
However, in Clark and Kiowa counties, the 2011 figures are similar to 2007 data. This
mirrors the city of Greensburg' s sales tax trend (Figure 11 ), which are now at pre-storm
levels. Kiowa County offers the second highest per capita personal income with the
exception of Edwards County as the top earning county. Kiowa County's per capita
income peaked in 2008 before beginning its slide. Down from its 2007 high of 8.1%,
Kiowa County has slowly trended upwards since. Other counties have also seen increases
in the percentage of people receiving food stamps. Ford County had the highest rate, at
11 %, in 2011. Despite having the second highest per capita income of the seven
contiguous counties, Kiowa County also has the second highest percentage of people in
poverty. While Ford County has the highest percentage of people in poverty, the counties
makes less than 33% compared to Kiowa County residents. All of the seven contiguous
counties have similar transfer payments trends. However, Comanche, Clark, and Barber
counties had the highest percentage of personal income coming from the transfer
payments at 25%.
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Figure 25. Tangible Assessed Valuation($) in Millions by County, 2006-2011. August
31, 2012, Kansas County Profile Report, The University of Kansas Institute for Policy &
Social Research. Adapted with permission of the author.
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Figure 26. Sales Tax Collection by County 1990, 2000, 2007-2011. August 31, 2012,
Kansas County Profile Report, The University of Kansas Institute for Policy & Social
Research. Adapted with permission of the author.
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Figure 27. BEA Per Capita Personal Income by County 1990, 2000, 2007-2010. August
31 , 2012, Kansas County Profile Report, The University of Kansas Institute for Policy &
Social Research. Adapted with permission of the author.
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Figure 28. Percent of Population Receiving Food Stamps by County 2000, 2007-2011.
August 31, 2012, Kansas County Profile Report, The University of Kansas Institute for
Policy & Social Research. Adapted with permission of the author.
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Qualitative Measure
Four themes emerged from the in-depth interviews, which were recorded and
transcribed. All of the comments were unedited. One was the role that outsiders played
into framing the need for Greensburg to become a green city. A second theme was
whether the green economic development would override the other economic
development issues that were confronting the town prior to the storm. A third theme that
surfaced was whether the town would be sustainable. Fourth, would the community
choose this post-disaster economic development approach if it had an opportunity to do it
agam.
One person served as the town's only reporter, a job that he took after arriving in
Greensburg as part of a reality television documentary series. Another person served as
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the city clerk, hired just two weeks before the tornado. Also, a businessman, who served
as the bank president of the town' s main bank, was interviewed to gather a perspective on
the economic development plans of the city. Finally, during the visit, the city's part-time
urban planner was interviewed. In September 2012, an elected official was interviewed
by phone. All of these interviews were extensive. Nearly all four of those interviewed in
person during the visit gave a qualitative and authoritative voice to the numbers. They
offered an insider' s insight that few other studies have been able to provide. All were
candid. Data was also gathered from the Kiowa County Appraiser's Office. Photos were
taken and documented during the visit, which ran from Sunday through Tuesday.
All four people interviewed acknowledged that experts from outside Kiowa
County were consulted and needed to create and fund the rebuilding. The comments were
very consistent. The repeating ideas were: BNIM (the architect), FEMA, Greensburg
GreenTown, the Discovery Channel, and persistent media attention had formidable places
at the decision table. Considered innovators, then-Kansas Gov. Kathle~n Sebelius and
then-City Administrator Steve Hewitt encouraged the move to sustainable building
practices, while media coverage led actor Leonardo DiCaprio to donate $400,000 to build
the business incubator with Frito Lay' s contribution for the remainder (White, 2010).
Sebelius was appointed to the Secretary of Health and Human Services under the Obama
Administration in 2009. Hewitt was named the 2008 Municipal Leader of the Year by
American City and County magazine and the 2009 Public Official of the Year by
Governing magazine. He left to take a similar position in Clinton, Oklahoma, in 2011

(Painter, 2011). Danielle Wallach, the executive director of Greensburg GreenTown,
continues to operate the nonprofit while starting another one, named GreenTown Joplin
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after the 2011 tornado destroyed parts of Joplin, Missouri. Since 2007, the nonprofit has
raised more than $950,000, according to Internal Revenue Service filings (IRS, 2011 ).
Though Wallach is rarely seen in Greensburg, and its most recent model eco-home has
been abandoned. The theme of outsider influence emerged from the repeated comments
that there was no technical expertise available within Kiowa County, and funding seemed
to increase proportionally with the green building incentives.

Role of outsiders

Green
economic
development
as a cure for
other existing
issues

Regrets over
the use of
green
economic
development

Is Greensburg's model
sustainable

Figure 31. The Themes of the Semi-Structured Personal Interviews.
All four people interviewed acknowledged that pre-storm economic conditions
were not favorable and a change was needed to stop the exodus of residents, even before
the storm. Corns, the banker, said that leakages continue because residents go to discount
stores in Pratt and Wichita. " If that money stays here, it's going to turn over six or seven
times," he said. "If it goes to Wichita, we' ll never see it again" (T. Corns, Personal
communication, April 15, 2013).
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Corns said the cluster of people who drove into Greensburg no longer occurs, a
tradition that he can vaguely remember as a child. He keeps a photo in the bank taken in
1952 by his father that showed Greensburg on a typical Saturday night. Every single
space on Main Street is filled with a car from all of the families of farmers that came in.
He comments.
It was kind of a quaint thing, but it just shows the level of business that we had in

1952 as opposed to now. If you came into town on a Saturday night (now), there
wouldn' t be any cars on the Main Street, and no businesses opened. It used to be
that everybody came into town, all the businesses stayed open until 9 pm. The
show was open; all the kids went to the show and had an ice cream cone.
(T. Corns, Personal communication, April 15, 2013)
The answer to the question of the viability of Greensburg looking forward was
filled with anecdotes, even as the for sale signs and empty streets were reminders of the
vacant feel. Michael Gurnee, the city's planner, blamed the poor economy for the city' s
tough times attracting industry. While a staunch defender of sustainability, Gurnee
acknowledged that it was definitely more costly. He said a company from Australia
donated dual flush, environmentally water saving toilets for people who were rebuilding
here. He was impressed by them, but at $300 to $400 each, even he opted for a less
expensive brand that only cost $150. "A lot of the so-called ' green initiatives' were very,
very expensive.. .. More engineering is going into things, and prices are coming down.
But I don' t know if that' s economic development or not" Gurnee said (J. Gurnee,
Personal communication, April 15, 2013).
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With the exception of Patrick Clement, the editor of the weekly paper, no other
person expressed some outright form of regret over the course of the restoration and the
jobs that failed to materialize. But, Christy Pyatt, the city clerk, said there would likely be
changes due to the functionality of some of the designs - and the costs of building green
without outside funding. Pyatt said the school was going to look the same, but not use
many of the same materials used in the original building because time has taught them
"what works and what didn ' t work" (C. Pyatt, Personal communication, April 15, 2013).
One of the most applauded aspects of the city' s redesign is the streetscape on
Main Street. But, according to Pyatt, that would need some major tweaks to make it
easier for large trucks to back in and out of parking spots, as well as easier for snow
removal.
On paper, it looks nice. But to the guy running a truck, he knows that when there
is three to four feet of snow drifted in there, he' s not going to know where that
bump out is at, and you 're going to get things like what happened out here at this
stop sign. Functionality. Storm water collection is great for watering, but it has to
rain. If it doesn' t rain, there' s no water to get in the tank. Yes, there are things
we've learned - functionality. (C. Pyatt, Personal communication, April 15, 2013)
Pragmatism aside, in other interviews (Sparks & White, 2013), residents could not
see the city' s fortunes improving, and they attributed the lack of economic development
and continued population skid to the green redevelopment, and an attitude that those
unwilling to build green were not welcomed. J. Michael Gumee's response to a question
might echo the sentiment:
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We had several people come in with the idea of building a Subway
restaurant, and one person came in and said ' you don' t have any of those
dam building codes, do you?' I said ' not only that, but we want a licensed
architect to design your building. ' ' Well, I'll go someplace else.' Okay,
sayonara. We don 't want them. (J. Gurnee, Personal communication, April
15, 2013)
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CHAPTER V
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND IMPLICATIONS
Introduction
Economic development theories and practices have evolved over time as the
economic thought on which most are founded has evolved. In general, an increase in the
tax base and jobs is equated with economic development, making a distinction from
economic growth which can be measured in the expansion of production by the annual
percentage increase in real local or state Gross Domestic Product (Hyman, 1994).
Economic development has a tendency to be centered on its objectives: a program, group
of policies, or activity that seeks to improve the economic well-being and quality oflife
for a community by creating and/or retaining jobs that facilitate growth and provide a
stable tax base (IEDC, 2006). Economic development, in practical terms, is loosely
defined by fuzzy iconic language that is synonymous with "successful economic
development" expressions such as good jobs, entrepreneurship, investment, increased tax
base, clusters, and economic prosperity (Rowe, 2009). But these terms have a tendency
of not being associated with a specific theory, so they are left to the interpretation - and
in many cases, the misinterpretation - of the person performing local economic
development, which can lead to some of the misunderstandings and misapplications from
various disciplines (Blakely & Leigh, 2010).
The International Economic Development Council (IEDC), an international trade
group headquartered in Washington D.C., points specifically to six theories (2006) that
serve as the basis for modem day economic development projects, policies, and practices
that borrow heavily from Blakely' s earlier editions of Planning Local Economic

1-.... .
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Development (1994). Neoclassical economic development theory accepts that capital

investments will seek the highest return. The pure competition dissuades market
interference. This framework can also be used to explain the same phenomenon with
human, political, social, and community capital. A drawback of this premise, noted by
IEDC, is that the highest return might be in low cost areas, such as blighted parts of
cities, which does not always happen (IEDC, 2006).
Economic base theory is the most popular understanding of economic
development. This theory is when firms create more jobs locally and products are
exported outside the community, and any method that assists such firms helps grow the
local economy. A criticism of this theory is that (IEDC, 2006) too much concentration on
these types of firms creates dependent, less diversified economies. This theory also tends
to ignore the opportunity presented to the communities by meeting demands from within,
stopping the leakage of income to outside towns through import substitutions. (Blakely
& Leigh, 2010)
Location theory assumes that the location decisions firms make are a result of
several factors, including proximity to airports, universities, and labor, along with the
stage of the company and purpose (IEDC, 2006). More often, firms are including the
logistical piece of warehousing and distribution in these decisions. The Achilles heel of
this theory has been the technological advances and the work-life balance that quality of
life issues raise (Blakely & Leigh, 2010).
Spiral or causation theory attributes local success or failure to local events and
conditions that wind around a central event that continues to recede or advance through a

89
series of cyclical movements (IEDC, 2006). Once started, the phenomenon requires
external forces to stop.
Product life-cycle theory seeks to explain why companies move, relating it to the
lifecycle of the products they produce. As companies mature, the steady decline of profits
leads to a search for areas of lower costs or competitive advantages (IEDC, 2006). Some
companies have products that quickly become obsolete, so they require the cheapest
production costs to absorb the new innovations. While other companies and industries are
not subject to product improvements (Blakely & Leigh, 2010).
New growth theory serves the framework for popular trends of investing in
research and development at universities, supporting entrepreneurship, and increasing
access to venture capital as a means of attracting an educated workforce (IEDC, 2006).
The social returns of these investments improve the rest of the region in this cyclical gain
that comes from firms being near other firms that are doing well (Malizia & Feser, 1999).
Now, experts say, the emergence of world markets has forced nations into a
hyperactive stage of globalism so intertwined that an economic earthquake in far off
places like Athens, Greece, has a very good chance of turning into an economic tsunami
here.
Economic development historians characterize the evolution of economic
development theory and practice by waves, as in a widespread movement that
encapsulates the predominant thinking of the time. But the term phase could just as easily
explain the chronological and overlapping periods underway at local and state economic
development organizations. As a result, the economic development profession wraps the
progression of local economic development as the first wave, followed by the second,
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onto the third wave, and onto any upcoming wave to give the appearance that there is a
seamless beginning and end to each period. Economic development literature declare the
first wave, after the Great Depression, as the industrial recruiting era, commonly referred
to as the South's "smokestack chasing," for its unmistakably visible sign of economic
development complete with cheap labor, cheap land and industry-friendly tax and loan
packages. This era helped explain the causes of regional growth and development, and it
was evident after World War II when Southern states provided the sweetest incentives in
the country's first introduction to corporate welfare (Bradshaw & Blakely, 1999).
The second phase marked its existence during the politically volatile 1960s and
continued during the energy crisis of the 1970s, where local government entered into the
local economic development arena in full force. The manufacturing decline and rising
global competition had government providing incentives, such as workforce training and
small business assistance, to ensure the foundation was properly constructed as opposed
to any firm-specific inducements. This measure would point to the demand side versus a
supply-side approach to the first phase. Economic historians, such as Peter Eisinger
(1988), point to the beginning of a more sophisticated marketplace resulting in applied
research, industrial modernization, entrepreneurship, and business expansion, as he
penned in The Rise of the Entrepreneurial State. As a result, the promotion of exports is
often associated with this phase, as well as government involvement in helping with the
demand.
The third phase is said to begin in the 1990s and called for an entrepreneurial
strategy and a place for other participants in the local economic development decision
making. This phase is a notable contrast to the previous one because it encompasses
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using regional resources to support the growth of clusters, offering few direct investments
to businesses (Blakely & Leigh, 2010). This stage had a less direct role for government
and was more about setting the environment, encouraging networks, regionalism, etc.
The significance of the clusters, which bring together technology, human, and financial
capital, is that they allow communities to compete globally. The emergence has led to
states opening international offices to coordinate business. As a result, the communities
that have successfully negotiated this wave have had more nontraditional stakeholders
involved, such as churches, civic groups, ethnic minorities, and schools. Some criticism
of this outgrowth is that it is another justification of industrial attraction and incentives on
a much grander scale, usually associated with the first wave (Miller, 2009).
The fourth phase grew out of a green approach to ensure growth did not come at
the expense of the environment. Noted by proponents for its sustainable characteristic,
this approach welcomed social, economic, and environmental benefits at the inclusion,
not exclusion, of each other (Blakely & Leigh, 2010). But these programs are expensive,
and the evaluations are still incomplete. Even without a clear-cut metric, many cities
worldwide are drawing up and executing costly, idealistic master plans that incorporate
sustainability in the midst of a worldwide recession, with little accompanying research
that gives a definitive answer as to its long-term merits and successes in an era of
deepening globalization. Many proponents of the green movement offer anecdotal and
short-term evidence. Even more telling is that the literature is scant as to whether green
development is appropriate after an extraordinary destruction when there is a premium on
decision-making, time, energy, and limited resources.
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Finally, the fifth phase uses two approaches: relying on market solution and
promoting city and regional development. It is almost like revisiting Adam Smith's, An
Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth ofNations, because there is a

resounding theme here: whatever the market will bear. Recognizing the negative
consequences of urban sprawl and traffic congestion, the fifth wave may provide the
impetus to turn around decaying downtowns and urban cities. However, it will come at
the expense of the lower income residents when gentrification prices them out of the
same areas (Blakely & Leigh, 2010).
Findings
One projection that clearly has not occurred at this point is the population' s
return. Several people interviewed blamed the Great Recession for the lack of new
businesses and residents relocating to Greensburg. However, internal U.S. migration rates
have flattened since 1980 (Molloy, Smith, & Wozniak, 201 1). The belief that these new
residents and corporations would descend on Greensburg ignored the city's role as a
periphery in the regional economy, with the only major city 100 miles away serving as
the core. Paul Krugman' s new economic geography explains that the economies of scale
and reduced transport costs ofliving elsewhere are reasons why people choose to live in
bigger towns and cities at the expense of more isolated communities (Krugman, 1991 ).
The architects of the town ' s Long Term Recovery Plan and Sustainable Comprehensive
Master Plan expected the cluster of similar green businesses to fulfill a self-reinforcing
process of more like-minded industries to follow; they did not.
At first glance, the choice to build a business incubator may appear to be a sound
idea to give fledgling companies an opportunity to grow. In Greensburg, it has not
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materialized. Instead, it is filled with many part-time entrepreneurs, including attorneys
and accountants who had offices in other cities, and its construction showed how quickly
eager organizers ignored the history of incubators and the necessary economic conditions
for an incubator to flourish. The economic development field in the United States did not
recognize business incubators until well into the fourth phase. In Greensburg, it was
immediately introduced. However, business incubators should not be the only means of
promoting entrepreneurship and innovation because other policy tools are available.
Instead, incubators should be seen as part of a framework of policies that centers itself on
the idea of spurring entrepreneurship, a sort of means to an end - not the end. It will not
cure all because capitalism is evolutionary (Akcomak, 2009).
High-tech businesses did not make their way to Greensburg because the town
could not meet five of the seven important factors required to support such businesses
(IEDC, 2006). While many researchers came from across the globe to visit the town,
there was no significant presence of research institutions that resulted from the constant
queries. The typical angel networks, private equity and other capital sources, are not
available. Although the state's Small Business Development Center operates inside the
business incubator, the office is manned part-time, and the typical entrepreneurial support
and business networking do not exist. Without a community college present, the educated
workforce to drive technology never materialized. The demand for fiber optic networks
and connectivity was not significant enough to invest in the technology infrastructure,
and the municipal airport has not garnered enough interest for its development, although
future plans do call for its expansion. The only bright spot is the commitment of state and
local governments to support technology growth companies. The IEDC (2006) believes

94
quality of place - not to be confused with quality of life - attracts and retains the
workforce through education, culture, entertainment, and recreation. Stough (2010) cites
the example of Austin, Texas in 1960, prior to becoming a technology-driven modem
city. To thrust itself several decades later, the city was able to capitalize on its
entrepreneurial spirit, significant public-private partnerships, educational institutions,
state tax structure, educated workforce, and quality of place.
In Greensburg, immediately following the storm, everyone was excited and
determined: hundreds of people attended meetings; the world was documenting; and
leadership was plenty. Then-mayor John Janssen had taken over in the midst of the early
days of the recovery because the previous mayor resigned. He was caught in the crossfire
of dissension between those who wanted to quickly rebuild inexpensively, and others
who were okay with living in the government trailers and the sustainability movement. "I
didn' t want a $300,000 home built next to a trailer park," he said in an interview with his
alma mater's alumni magazine (Campbell, 2008, Tough Times Require Tough Decisions
section, para. 3). "A lot of decisions had to be made to get the town back on track. And a
lot of the decisions I made weren't popular. But if it' s got to be done, then it's got to be
done," he voiced. He lost the 2008 election to Bob Dixson, a retired postmaster.
Today, the enthusiasm has dried up. City Council meetings are sparsely attended.
Thomas Corns, the banker, said the engagement has disappeared. So has the momentum
from leadership. One of the key lessons learned and recommended by the National
Renewable Energy Laboratory was strong leadership. In Greensburg, that direction
started when the City Council passed an ordinance requiring the most stringent of green
building standards for all public buildings - LEED Platinum level with a minimum of 42%
energy savings (Pless, Billman, & Wallach, 20 I 0). "This unique requirement demonstrated
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the City's leadership to sustainable rebuilding," the authors wrote for a paper presented at the
2010 American Council for Energy-Efficient Economy. "This leadership and commitment
encouraged other Greensburg commercial and public projects to consider similar goals and to
foster a sustainable business environment." (Pless, Billman, & Wallach, 2010, p. 4).
In 2012, Dee Chandler, the former director of the Kiowa County Economic
Development office, penned a short editorial noting that Greensburg was destined to
succeed in attracting "the kinds of sustainable, alternative energy companies the rebuild
set out to attract" (Chandler, 2012, para. 7). But months later said she felt usurped when
city officials traveled to Texas to meet with a firm that recruits technology companies.
The city eventually signed a multi-year contract, and she left (Clement, 2012c). " From
the get go it was an uphill battle. There is a percentage of the county that doesn 't even
think the position (of Economic Development Director) should exist," Chandler said in
the interview (Clement, 2012c, para. 5). The office was created as part of the Long Term
Recovery Plan.
Recommendations
Scholars will spend the next decade dissecting Greensburg, and the economic
development profession should join it for all of the valuable lessons that it may teach
from the exceptional set of conditions that created the momentum to rebuild a town on
the principles of sustainability. Each year, disasters plague communities nationwide, and
the leaders and stakeholders will be given an opportunity to choose their destiny. They
must choose wisely, and the economic developer must have a seat at the decision-making
table to offer guidance as it goes about reengineering decades of development in a short
window.

96
Incubator

The city's incubator is an untapped resource. No different from other fields, one
size does not fit all in the appropriate model for business incubation. However,
universities continue to be a great resource, particularly if they are nearby, and all of the
key stakeholders and facilities can be concentrated there. Universities are becoming
increasingly responsive to the long-term needs of industry and small and medium sized
enterprises. Blending the interests of industry and the university, places university
graduates in industrial settings where their education and training is honed and effectively
used. This marriage raises the technological profile of the business enterprise and the
business behavior of the university.
The incubator may become the conduit of effective communication between
technology-based businesses and universities. Universities are well positioned to collect
and analyze data critical to member enterprises, as well as to the incubator staff. This
information can then be utilized to improve student education, providing a better trained
future workforce. The university incubator can create a more business-oriented approach,
giving the firms located in it the opportunity to create service and research centers in
targeted industries, foster university and business partnerships, increase student
businesses, while making the full resources of the university available to help these
fledgling firms (De la Garza, 1993).
One model that has proven effective is the University of Central Florida, which
saw the evolution of their incubator in six practices: (1) recognize the need; (2) gain
university commitment; (3) gain financial support; (4) gain public awareness and support;
(5) learn the incubator business; and (6) select the right clients (O'Neal, 2005).

97
Model of Elements for a Successful University-Based Technology Incubator
E'\Olution
Re:ogn ize ne.;d
Gain uni~Qr~tycomm io:ment
Gain funding
Gain pu bli: awar"'1ess and suppon
w;,rn about th• incubator bu~ness
Select the rghtcli:!nts

~
Results

~~

Su«- Fact,o 15

Bu sine ss develo pment
Leasing arra ngement services

Business assistance sen,i:es

lnfrastructu!Q

~

Integrate clients in the larger
technolo;;i)' development system
Fosterin1'lra:tions bQtW<>ena
client and othercfient~ incubator
ma nagemeniother staff.outside
indiv idoJals,ll!ld the incubator
<dl/i!l'.)fpanel
Provide access to exlOrnal
funding ,ources,uni~rsity
resource~corn mun lty/local

Fa:i ities

g:JIJ4i!!rnmii!ntQCOnomic

S(aff

development agen cie~and other
enu.,preneuri!II su ppon
organizatbns

Com~nies
Pro:l ucts

V

F\oopie

Figure 32. University of Central Florida Technology Incubator Model.
UCF leveraged an existing relationship with the Scottish government and the
political acumen of then-Florida Gov. Lawton Chiles into several trips which culminated
in an agreement. Seeking an ideal place in the United States to put a technology center,
the Scottish government chose Orlando. As a major tenant, UCF secured several other
tenants - and the accompanying financial stability - with the addition of the Florida High
Tech Corridor, the city of Orlando, Orange County government, and the Technology
Research and Development Authority. The director leaned heavily on the National
Business Incubator Association by attending events and gleaning NBIA materials to
establish the initial policies for the incubator. The incubator then ensured its own success
by creating a seven session pre-incubation program, "Excellence in Entrepreneurship," to
select the right companies by incorporating the UCF College of Business Administration
(O'Neal, 2005). Five year after its creation, the UCF incubator was named 2004
Incubator of the Year by NBIA in the technology sector. Today, the incubator has
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expanded to nine locations and is credited with assisting 300 companies in creating more
than $500 million in revenue and 3,200 new jobs (Owen, 2012).
Core-Periphery
Krugman (1991) said manufacturing would take place with large nearby demand
since production near the demand would minimize the transportation costs with other
locations served through these sites. A region with a large non-rural population would be
an attractive place to produce agriculture and manufacturing because of the larger market
and the accompanying goods and services afforded there. Then, at the expense of smaller
towns, the population will grow, and the process continues until there is a concentration
of only a few regions. Therefore, if Region A (outside Greensburg) has slightly more
population than Region B (city of Greensburg) and transportation costs fall considerably,
Region A will gain more population at Region B's expense. So, with few exceptions,
there cannot be economic growth without population growth.
The EDA report (2004) forewarns that the growing information age will likely
hurt rural and isolated areas because of connectivity to ideas and business practices. As
the global economy becomes more a part of the local and regional economy, the
competition that Greensburg will face will also come from different regions across the
world. For economic developers, this means that the very same practices that have been
used will be insufficient, and training and human capital development will have to be part
of the mix of activities. Using the core-periphery argument, the city of Greensburg will
have to find ways to become a viable suburb or alternative to the towns of Pratt and
Dodge City. It is very much possible that the town' s future will be tied to the future of
those bigger towns. Robert Lake, professor at the Bloustein School of Planning and
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Public Policy at Rutgers University, was one of the key researchers for the EDA report.
Lake believes that the conditions that work to disconnect certain communities from
access to investment tend to have that effect over long periods of time. He offers:
... If community X is perceived as an unfavorable site for investment (because of

its location, or its lack of resources, or for some other reason), those conditions
tend to continue to make it an unfavorable site for investment over time. This is
why EDA's strategy of infrastructure investment, etc. was rarely sufficient to
make such a community "investment ready" when everything else points in the
opposite direction. (Lake, R., personal communication, October, 14, 2013)
Economic development leadership
Nongovernmental leadership has a tendency of emerging to address regional
economic issues, and it takes on the form of either a person or small group of people who
envision a better regional economy filled with social and individual benefits or from a
major devastation (Stough, 2010). Economic developers rarely stand alone in business
decisions with strategic implications. They require broad base local support, and the
ability to continually reassess projects, learn from mistakes, and respond to changes in
the marketplace (Malizia, 1985). For this to happen, economic development requires the
input of chief executives from dynamic corporations who are willing to take part in the
headship of the economic development organization (EDO). C-level executives will take
part in EDOs, even if not immediately part of the local area, if they view it as the means
of keeping in touch with peers and trends, find the participation challenging and
rewarding, and have the ability to influence the agenda (McGraw, 2003).
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In the case of Greensburg, leaders were sufficient in the beginning, but newer
faces did not surface, which caused a major deficiency in new ideas as momentum
dropped. This leadership dimension is relatively overlooked in the development of
economies. The leadership requires a charismatic ability to galvanize coupled with the
intelligence, education, experience and wisdom to lead. Failure to provide that type of
leadership in this globalized market is the predecessor of extinction.
Summary of the Study
By any economic measure, the city of Greensburg's prospects hang in the
balance. By the day, they appear slimmer. In six years, not one major corporation in the
green industry has moved to the country's green model city. Why not? There are many
plausible reasons that the literature offers. But such academic reasons might cloud the
rationale in the same way that smart people insisted on giving Greensburg a fresh start
with an unproven, expensive concept. Patrick Clement said (personal communication,
April 15, 2013) there were not enough amenities for young urban professionals to move
there, yet he did. But that had more to do with a vocation that brought him there,
extracted what it needed, and then left. (He later came back to accept the newspaper
position.) Clement is the exception. Residents like Thomas Corns are the rule. Educated
and relatively affluent, he stayed and bought up as many properties as he could to avoid
having an eye-sore across the street from him, a trailer.
The German leading economists are warning that green economic development is
a fool's game, like playing soccer with a severe handicap and being expected to keep up
(Evans-Pritchard, 2013 ). Greensburg is playing by different rules than its neighbors - and
the rest of the country - and expecting to win. It will not, and not because it did not do
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everything it could. It will not win because everyone else has decided to ignore the green
movement. There is little value in certificates and accolades that do not pay off.
Hagelman (2012) notes that one lesson that can be learned from Greensburg is the
likelihood that companies will execute a plan to move to more advantageous locations
immediately following a catastrophe. Some did move into the city, but more moved
outside of it, taking advantage oflower rents.
Does green economic development make sense as a post-disaster approach? As
complex as the question is, this thesis set out to answer that question. In some respects, it
was successful. In other cases, the limitations were evident. The town of Greensburg is an
atypical case study. It is small, 100 miles away from a sizable city, and nearly destroyed.
But it had a chance to do what no other city in modem times has had the opportunity to
do - start over from scratch and reinvent itself in a way that only it could imagine. If
success has many fathers, and failure is an orphan then where does Greensburg stand?
How does it rate as one of the most courageous and triumphant attempts at balancing the
needs of the planet with the needs of its people? Sparks and White (2013) state the plans
conceived for people, must have people in mind, because they are the ones who will be
left to live with it.
More than five years after President Bush stepped foot in Greensburg, it is still
too early to tell. But if a mid-term grade were to be awarded, it would be very difficult to
say it has been successful. The city continues to get accolades for its green buildings,
most recently receiving a certificate for achieveing LEED Platinum on the City Hall
building. In November 2013, Mayor Bob Dixson was scheduled to travel to Philadelphia
to accept the 2013 Richard M. Daily Sustainability Award from the United States Green
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Building Council on behalf of the city. While he is there, he will make a presentation on
Greensburg at the USBGC conference (City of Greensburg, 2013b). Success, in this case,
has many fathers.
But certificates do not necessarily equal monetary success, and five years is not
long enough to gauge the success or failure of any program. Few researchers have
traveled back to investigate how Greensburg is coming along, and when they do, they are
still more interested in the design, architecture, and social science of people and place. If
they asked for copies of the tax returns, they might discover something completely
different, a different narrative than the one that has been told and sold to the public. That
same public has long moved on as have the professionals who used Greensburg for their
own agenda. There may have been no malice, but urban planners, architects, engineers,
and proponents of green economic development suspended the laws of economics for the
inconvenient truth that global markets punish extreme cases of blind faith and fiscal
ignorance. Many in the urban planning profession believe they possess the key to the
city' s vitality and also have the ear of the federal government. The National Renewable
Energy Laboratory also had a major stake by encouraging the development.
The weaknesses within the economy of Greensburg, Kiowa County, and western
Kansas, never disappeared after the town moved forward as a green city. They were
simply masked. Like hundreds of other rural communities throughout the United States,
Greensburg must deal with its dimunitive size, geographic isolation, and undiversified
economy. The efforts to green did not materialize as expected, and continue not to do so.
Soon, the federal funding will disappear from the city' s coffers, and the dwindling tax
base in Greensburg will be left to fund the LEED buildings.
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The financial statements may tell part of the story today. The interviews of the
residents and key stakeholders tell a different one. The trends even indicate there are
many other factors at play. In any event, Greensburg took a chance to lead. With the help
of others, it did. The question, ultimately, is whether doing so ended its long-term
viability. While the roads, facilities, and homes come first in the restoration after a
disaster, those are the easier tasks to see and easier tasks to accomplish, and they serve as
symbols of successful recovery. It is the chicken before the egg, some believe. The
economic vitality is a more difficult task, and impediments to growth only exacerbate the
issues (Sjostrom, 2011).
The day before the tornado there were 63 businesses. Days after the storm, 62
businesses indicated they would rebuild, according to Thomas Corns. In April 2013, there
were only 33 business permits on file at Greensburg City Hall. It is not clear if Corns
meant 62 businesses strictly within the city' s limits or 62 businesses in the county
(T. Corns, Personal communications, April 15, 2013). The city's 33 permits on record are
also not something that can be taken at face value. For instance, during the summer of
2013, local eatery Kook's Meat was notified that it did not have a business permit to
operate in the city. It is located less than three blocks from City Hall and has been in
business since 2009 (City of Greensburg, 2013a). Hagelman (2012) notes that the city's
business geography changed as new companies replaced less than half of the businesses
lost after the storm. The symptoms of a sick economy were in Greensburg prior to the
tornado. Few dispute it. The tornado merely unveiled the reminders that the infrastructure
was in dire straits, with the population aging and moving away and the tax base with it.
Consequently, resources dwindled and contributed to the overall decline. So, this
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certainly set the stage for "swift and radical changes like those witnessed in the aftermath
of Katrina" (Morrish, 2008). Morrish notes:
Campaigns for "green objects" and green imperatives do not automatically add up
to sustainable design and development. The process demands a much more
comprehensive approach and continuing effort to integrate built and natural
systems in ways that create reflexive landscapes. (Morrish, 2008, p. 1011)
Future Research
Recommendations for further study include keeping a close look at sales taxes, ad
valorem, and ulitilites. A continued study of nei,~hboring towns and counties to see
whether the population estimates were accurate would provide insight into the strength of
the Economic Health Indicator. A good question is what will happen after the
Neighborhood Revitalization Program tax abatement expires in 2018-2019.
Conclusions
Just where will Greensburg be in 2020, 2030, or 2040? One prediction is that as
the population continues to skid in Kiowa County and the real tax rate is realized by
homeowners, the demand for the owner-occupied homes will predicatively fall . That will
be the catalyst. The decrease in demand will cause a decrease in market equilibrium price
(E1), and when few home sellers are able to get the price they initially paid for
reconstruction, this will create a surplus. With no need to build more homes, this will
likely continue until there is a new equilibrium price (E2) (Hyman, 1994).
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Figure 33. Predicted Impact of a Decrease in Demand on the Kiowa County Home
Market Equilibrium in 2030.

The needs of the residents and business owners who remain long after the storm
will ultimately pay the price or have the most to gain. Therefore, it is important to take all
calculations into effect and not plan in a vacuum. "As planners continue to contemplate
plan implementation and effectiveness, the case of Greensburg, Kansas shows that it is
important to consider both physical and social impacts of plans" (Sparks & White, 2013,
p.15). We may also want to consider the economics of the plan.
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APPENDIX A
INTERVIEW WITH PATRICK CLEMENT
Patrick Clement, 33, editor of the weekly Kiowa County Signal, the town' s lone
newspaper, arrived in town from Los Angeles as part of the television production team
from the Discovery Channel that was making a documentary-style reality show of the
town that aired on Planet Green. The show made Greensburg well-known. Clement
position gave him a daily take on life in Greensburg.

Patrick Clement of the Kiowa County Signal newspaper (photo by David E. Leiva)
I experienced Greensburg as a visitor just like how you are experiencing
Greensburg as a visitor. After the tornado, people here are conscious who is a visitor and
how important it is to make an impression. When I was here I worked for the Discovery
Channel, which at the time was a big deal, so I was treated a very specific way. I wanted
to know if that's really what Greensburg was like. I made an assumption that it wasn't
that way. And I was correct. And there are reasons for that, and it's tied to every part of
the county. From Haviland to Mullinville to Greensburg. That' s sort of one of the
symptoms of the way the community has changed, and the way the economy of the

107
community has changed. That was one of my goals - to find out what was Greensburg
really like. I think I've reached that goal. I think I've been able to do that, to really
understand what the community is really like, what's happening in the community, and to
put the pieces together as to what happened immediately after the tornado . I genuinely
believe I have done that. I feel I have a complete picture; otherwise if it' s not a
comprehensive view of the community, then I don' t have what I want.

Like a King?
Yes. They rolled out the red carpet.
Personally, I'm more interested in what Greensburg was like before the tornado; I
think it's more fascinating. My guess would be that Greensburg will be the last one
standing of these small towns in the county.

The experts who came here said the city 's population would return to its pre-storm count
by 201 2. Any comments?
People will be upset with me if I say this, but this is the reality: that' s never going
to happen, and there's a very specific reason why it's not going to happen. It's not a
simple answer, but it's just not going to happen. My fiance would be upset because she
thinks I'm being negative. But it's not about negativity; it's about reality. It is forces that
are out of an individual person's control. The population of the town is in control as a
whole. They could control their future, but it's just not going to happen because despite
on the surface that there is this overwhelming community feeling here, it doesn't exist.
This is not what you and I - if we are from a more populated area - would consider to be
a community. These are people who live close to one another, but the concept that we
know of as a community is almost a foreign concept here. If the future of the town could
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be changed by the community as a whole, and it's dependent upon this united common
thread that runs amongst people who live here. It will never happen.
When decisions were being made to build Greensburg the way that it is, it was
those individuals who had that power, all the decisions that were made. Now people may
disagree with that. "Well, we had the meetings, and people voted and voiced their
opinions." I think that was more about the process and less about the results. When they
built the town, it was a handful of individuals that decided, made the decisions, and sold
it to the community. So, those individuals had a lot of power, and they were the ones that
created this idea and then sold it to the community. But unfortunately, now for the future,
it is the community that has to step up as a whole and do that. I would love to be proved
wrong; I would love to see Greensburg 10 years from now double in size. I would love to
see that. But the reality is that I don 't see it happening.
Does green economic development work?
I think it makes sense. I think any person with half a brain realizes that we are
going to have to change the way we do business as a country, as a planet, because our
model is destructive. People can dispute it, but really we all agree there are finite
resources. For here, it moves to more practical concerns. So, could green economic
development happen in Greensburg? It could, but there are a lot of things that will keep it
from happening. I'll give you a short list.
First, we're in southwestern Kansas, and aside from the logistical problems that it
causes, people say "we' re on a rail line." Yeah, there' s a rail line in a lot of places. "Oh
well, we are close to some shipping things, we' re center of the country." That was
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another pitch. So whatever the shipping is will be half as cheap because you're not
shipping from the East Coast to the West Coast, and you're in the middle.
On a more practical level, green industry is founded and created by young
professionals, and they are not going to move to Greensburg. Why would they move to
Greensburg where there's no Starbucks? There' s no private school for their children? It's
windy, dusty, and dirty.
And add on top of the fact that what they can offer for incentives isn' t competitive
with other like positions communities? Even Hutchinson is a better choice, and it is 45
minutes away. They have an international airport, infrastructure. They have things like
water, water pipes. If you build a building out here in the industrial park, there's water
that goes there, but it's not easy. You still have to hook it up, and there's an expense of
running the building, and the city can' t say it will give you $ 100 million in tax breaks.
You get $1 rent, that's great, but it's just not attractive enough.
And this idea that a cache of green is going to override all that other business
sense is just not realistic. Now, they' ll make the pitch, and that's what you do when
you're a salesman. You're going to say that we're central in the United States; we' re on a
rail line. They're redoing the highway. So it' s a two-lane highway within five years, and
it' s a small community with good schools for your kids. That' s all well and good, and
they should be making that pitch, that's the pitch the city is going to give, that economic
development is going to give, but the reality is that that picture just is not attractive
enough to bring those types of businesses here. It just isn't. And they know that, but they
still have to give that pitch. They understand the challenges.
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Do you think they were sold by these big city architects?
I think they hired people, a talented group, wherever they are coming from - the
city. They imprinted their own experiences on Greensburg. Here' s a perfect example: The
incubator building, which was partially a gift, partially USDA funds, it costs the city
$120,000 a year to operate in contract services since it was built. And that doesn't include
that the foundation is cracking, and they' re going to have to do major repairs in the next
year. You want businesses in there. The whole idea is that it's at a loss that you are going
to pay low rent to bring people in, which by the way, actually per foot is more expensive
than the building across the street which is a privately-owned building. So, it's more
expensive by the square foot, and the storefronts were constructed for foot traffic. If you
see all those mockups, look at them - the designs, the concept art. You see all these
people; everyone' s walking around. That doesn' t happen. People drive.
People here aren' t strolling down Main Street. There is no density, so when they
designed it, it was designed for a city person. When I walk by that block, when I'm
walking I see a beautiful window display. When I'm driving by it, I don' t see anything.
So, the design - some of those little things - is part of the bigger flaw. If you're going to
have a drive-by business, you need big window displays. Highway traffic, bigger window
displays. Now, it's on a great corner, but all the retail is on the Main Street not the
highway side. The most traveled side is the highway side. And did anyone ask those
questions? And if they did, I think it was those small individuals that they either didn' t
want to listen or made the decision on their own without that input. Somebody must have
said, "Why aren' t the windows bigger?"
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Rendering in Long Term Community Recovery Plan of Pedestrians on Main Street.
Again, that leads me to believe that it was a small group of people that were
making a lot of the decisions, but in the long-term, it's going to take more people. So,
green economic development for Greensburg, I just don' t think it's a reality. I think a
microeconomic approach - two to three person jobs - is where Greensburg can grow and
at least level off. If you are opening two to three person jobs every couple of months or
once or twice a year, then you can at least stop the bleeding.
I am surprised the universities didn 't get more heavily involved here.
I don' t know why they didn' t try to get a satellite university here; either an agricultural or
green architect university to actually build something here. Nothing sustains an economy
like a university.
When was the last time you saw Leonardo DiCaprio or the owners ofBen & Jerry's?
I don' t blame them. I think they were like everybody else; it was the thing of the
moment. And, they wanted to do their part. But they weren' t going to be in it for the long
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haul, and I think everyone here also understood that. They knew that the Discovery
Channel would leave; it wasn't going to be a 10-year show. They didn ' t expect
(University of Kansas) to make a permanent part of the community. They were going to
come in, get what they get, and that's it. Just like the Today Show, they built a neat
playground, but they have to move on. They' re moving onto something else. And that's
with the media and everybody else.
What can we get out of them now, which is smart. Let' s get what we can get
while the getting is good. Leonardo DiCaprio sent some money on this building, but it
has cost the city more money than he gave. It' s the gift that keeps on giving. $120,000 a
year for a city doesn 't seem like a lot, but when you have a shrinking tax base, $120,000
a year for upkeep is a lot. And, there are two vacancies in the most visible retail locations.
Do you believe the big city guy s took advantage?

I don 't believe that. I think the people who came in - they are business people - I
think they genuinely had the best interest of the people at heart. Was it business, did they
see it as work? Sure. The city of Greensburg was spending money like it wasn' t theirs
because it wasn' t. I think there was a big blowout with BNIM (you should spend some
time researching the relationship with Steve Hewitt, the former city administrator).
You ' re not going to get that in the paper because the editor at the time was hands-off; the
editor of the paper at the time was co-signing all this stuff without really being objective
about what was happening. But I believe you can do some research and find out that the
city administrator, following the tornado, and BNIM, who designed Main Street and the
other buildings, there was some stuff going on there where there was either some
exchange for contracts. Eventually, it blew out where BNIM brought in a design for the
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Big Well Museum, and the city didn' t' like it. The city said we want something different.
BNIM said, "Screw you, we know what we are doing." The city said, "You' re fired. " But
by then, they had already spent so much money on those initial designs that when they
actually hired someone else, (Mccown Gordon Construction LLC), to do the Big Well,
the money they lost on that initial design was the difference between being a Leadership
in Energy & Environmental Design (LEED) building and it not being a LEED building.
Ouch! And I was in those meetings when the City Council decided that the Big Well,
which was the most visited building in town, was not going to be a LEED platinum
building because the costs of the wells they were going to have to build for the heating
and air conditioning the geothermal well, they couldn' t cover that cost because the
difference between that and traditional HVAC was very close to the amount they lost on
the initial design.
So, did BNIM take advantage? I would say there were some negatives that came
out of that. I wouldn't say they intentionally tried to take advantage, but look these are
city architects that have done extremely popular jobs, won awards. They come into
Greensburg, and I think it's a dick-measuring contest. "We' re BNIM. We' ve won awards
for your Main Street, and you 're going to tell us our design isn' t right." You' ve got to
remember that these people are also rebuilding their own homes while this is going on,
and they were like, "Whatever, that looks good."
Thoughts on Greensburg GreenTown?
Oh, that' s a whole other interview. It' s a big deal how Greensburg GreenTown is
operated in Greensburg. There are two sides to that street. Greensburg GreenTown has
questionable accounting practices. Their executive director has made, at the least,
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unethical moves, and of course, at the most, fraud, which is really a shame. They really
had an opportunity to do something amazing there, and my opinion is that they
squandered that with a lot of bad decision-making.
Greensburg GreenTown is not part of Greensburg because it is not a green
community. People here don't live a green life. Go into the bathroom and see what
chemicals they use to clean the bathrooms. Go into someone's house and ask them if you
- you can't get recycled paper towels at the KWIK Shop/Dillon's store. I have to drive
out of town to get recycled paper towel, which drives me crazy. So Greensburg
GreenTown whose mission statement is sort oflike what happens after the building
comes in; they don't fit. That's why there is no fulltime employee there anymore.
Basically, what they are operating on now are two AmeriCorps interns, paid by
AmeriCorps, and I don't know how long that is going to go on. I suspect that eventually
it may end, and then there won't be anyone there to operate GreenTown.

The Unfinished Meadowlark House in Greensburg (photo by David E. Leiva).
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What about the Meadowlark House?
I'll give you the Reader 's Digest version. Greensburg GreenTown had a contest
where they asked people to design a green house, and they would build it as a model
home. There was a design company that won for the Meadowlark House, which is this
unfinished building. And part of that was they discovered this company called HIB,
which was a German company, actually a timber company in the Black Forest. They
basically cut down trees in the Black Forest; that's their business model. The newer
generation, one of the sons, because it's a third generation company, decided to start this
business where it' s sort of a modular wooden home. So you build it with wood, and then
you can fill it with sand or cut-up jeans. It' s supposed to be extremely strong and
insulated. The idea was to build this HIB with that block.
During those conversations, HIB took an interest in building a factory in
Greensburg. Now it went from being a GreenTown thing, which at least, as I understand,
told them that HIB would have to pay GreenTown a significant percentage of sales for
them to come to America. Basically, GreenTown said if you want to come to America,
you have to pay a finder' s fee. HIB said, "Screw you." They found some local investors
in Greensburg, and there were discussions over the course of eight months about HIB
building a factory here in Greensburg financed, in part, by local investors. That deal was
very close to happening. But again, ego versus ego, who needs who more, and what
ended up being was HIB said, "Fuck you, we don' t need Greensburg," and the local
investors said, " Fuck you, we don' t need HIB." Dead. Dead in the water.
Multimillion dollar deal, 30 to 40 employees; they were going to build housing on
the HIB block. And, at one point, HIB decided that if they were going to move the
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factory here, this Meadowlark House, was such an eye sore that they were going to pay
money out of pocket to fix it up. So that's the long story of that house. HIB never came.
They're not coming. The local investors invested in another company, which is
downstairs. Those are the same investors, a similar product. And so now the Meadowlark
Home is sitting vacant. And it will remain vacant until the city decides that they want to
punish them with some type of nuisance ordinance, which I think is fair. It's been there
for years. There' s nothing on the horizon. It touches everything, and that's just another
example.
You talk to media. I am sure the media comes see you at some point. Do they not want to
see it?
They haven' t reached out to me. I don' t blame them. A recent USA Today story
was a fluff piece. Everybody here knows it was a fluff piece. The mayor knows it was a
fluff piece. USA Today knows it was a fluff piece. I mean, how is it going to make them
look --the greenest town in America that is a lie? USA Today isn' t going to do that.
So, the only news organization that I feel has reported fairly every step of the way
is the Kiowa County Signal, and we've paid the price. I ran a story about the Family
Dollar. So the city spent a significant amount of money to buy this lot, and they gave it
away to lure Family Dollar. Economic development wise, I get it. You' re going to have
to have that type of business. It's got a dozen employees; they pay sales tax. I mean it
makes sense. During that process, when the mayor pitched that idea to the City Council,
he said this is going to be one of the greenest buildings in town, a flagship green Family
Dollar building. Pitched it to the City Council, pitched it in the press release. But I spent
time, and it turns out it' s not a green building. It's a shit. It's got concrete floors. If you
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want to expand the idea of green, a sure, concrete floor is great. They are easy to clean.
Skylights? Can you pitch skylights as being green? Yes, you can. But it is green washing;
it' s not really green. They used yellow insulation; they didn' t use the insulated concrete
like we have in this building. They didn 't use geothermal wells. They didn ' t do anything.
It' s not a green building.
So, I wrote a piece that I think is very good news reporting that somewhere
between the developer, Mayor Bob Dixon and the City Council, wires got crossed
because the developer said, "We never said it was going to be a green building." Now, I
wrote that story, and, again, I feel it was very good news reporting. Everything I do like
that, I pass through two or three of my higher-tips to make sure everything is legal. They
all said, "That is good news." I had sources. I contacted Family Dollar. I contacted U.S
.Green Building Council that manufactures the LEED. It turns out Family Dollar does
have a LEED building that they built five years ago before this one. Again, using flagship
green building is deceptive because it wasn' t their first LEED building. I lost 1O papers a
week since I posted that article. The week after that, my circulation went down by 10
papers, and it' s never made up for.
They fired the economic development person, Dee Chandler. They fired her. And,
another of these investors said I think we can do a better job with economic development.
I think I covered it fairly in the paper; I gave each side a fair shake, probably lost half
dozen papers because of that article. Now, it's bad business. When the paper goes, there
will be no news organization that can accurately report on what is happening in
Greensburg. I think it's closer than I would like to believe. I'd be very surprised if the
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paper exists after I leave. So, USA Today, they' re weekend warriors. The USA Today
article is great for the city, but it's a fluff piece.
I would be concerned about someone coming here expecting to see what has been written
and it 's nothing like it.

It' s become part of the economy here, tourism. You have to fly into Wichita, rent
a car, drive out here, get gas, and stay in a hotel. So, they are very aware of what that
means to the city to maintain this sort of green tourism concept where people can come
and see this living laboratory. The ad in the USA Today said "authentic." The city
actually bought a half-page ad, and under Greensburg it said "authentic." And, I
understand why they used that word, and the message they are trying to convey. But the
fact is, it' s not a real message. It's like going to a circus, and they say, "Come see the
man-eating chicken." But it doesn' t matter, because you' re already here, and you've
already spent the money. The buildings are beautiful, and a lot of people just want to
accept that story. "Hey, this is a green town. This is what happens."
Ifyou are somewhere else in America, should y ou copy and paste what happened here in
Greensburg?

I do think you can take the principles of some of these building and apply them to
other communities. Yes, I believe that. But I would say that it is possible, and likely
probable, they are going to apply the same principles to another community. Now, there
were a very unique set of circumstances that made that all possible here in Greensburg.
Small community, 99.9% gone. These are white farmers, America, com. I am sure at
some point it will happen again.
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Green building does work. The house my fiancee and I live in its concrete
insulated foam, and our utility bills are 40 to 50% less than our neighbors who live in a
traditional home. I don' t feel the wind at night; the house doesn't shake. If there was a
fire, it wouldn' t travel through the walls because it is concrete and stays in the comer.
Supposedly, ifthere were a tornado, it could absorb the impact of a car and not crumble
the house. That' s impressive. Geothermal well works great. You do pay more upfront,
but the more people do it, the more the costs will go down. Up here, just because of the
location, construction costs are super high because they have to travel to bring everything
here. Now, my house, even though we are a renter, is upside down. Every single person's
house who rebuilt in Greensburg is upside down. They spent more money on it than it is
worth. They' ll lose money if they walk out, and that has nothing to do with the economy
- that has to do with the high costs of new construction.
Clearly, this is a byproduct ofsupply and demand.
Yes. Did anyone explain to you how housing works here?
No.
This is the stuff I find most fascinating. So, here' s Greensburg. This is Haviland.
This is Mullinville. The tornado comes through and wipes out every single home in
Greensburg. Fourteen hundred people live here; half of those people move out of
Greensburg after the tornado because they are renters or they are property owners who
realize, outside the emotion factors, financially, it doesn't make sense. So, a lot of them
move to Haviland, where the college is; some others move to Mullinville; some people
move into Pratt. Because suddenly you' re out 500 to 700 homes, there's a need.
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People want to live in the county, but they can't live in Greensburg because
there' s no place to live in Greensburg, so they move to Mullinville or Haviland.
Suddenly, supply and demand, property values start to go up. So, volume is down but
property values go up. As property values go up, that also means valuation goes up.
So a house that at one time was once $20,000 in Haviland suddenly is $80,000.
Now, for people like me and you, we see that as a jackpot - " Please let the value of my
house double" - and that's what a lot of people did. They said, "Damn, this house that we
have - that we don' t even pay on except taxes - is nothing." So, they sell, and they sell to
the highest bidder, which sets the precedent for property values. This means that when
the assessor goes back and evaluates the neighbor' s home, which was $20,000, he bases
the valuations on the sales of similar homes. So now, this sweet old lady who has lived in
that family home that a week ago was worth $20,000 - the neighbor's home just sold for
$80,000 - must pay taxes on $80,000. So suddenly, grandma is paying four times the
value in taxes. She' s on a fixed income. She retired as a librarian. She has a little bit of
money; she can barely afford that home. So, you know what happens? She sells it for
more because there' s a need. Now she' s in assisted living. That house sells for $120,000,
so next year that $80,000 house is valued at $120,000 and so on until it reaches the point
where the price of a house in Haviland is almost equal to the cost of rebuilding in
Greensburg.
Either way, you are going to be in debt, but if you are going to rebuild in
Greensburg, at least, it will be a brand new house. That' s why people build in
Greensburg. They' re upside down, and they're cool with it. Now that's a heightened
market in a real short time. Those prices have begun to come down. They don' t care if
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raising taxes is a good thing. They just don' t like the idea, and the county appraiser is an
employee of the County Commissioners, who are elected officials. If those prices are
artificially inflated, that a $20,000 house can't sell for $20,000, all the houses will
continue to remain overpriced. They won' t pay that price. "Why would I do that, I can
move to Pratt."
So the population right now is stabilized, but I know a half-dozen people will
walk away from their house and move somewhere else if they find a buyer. There are
homeowners who don' t want those values to go down either because the further it goes
down, they' ll lose. There are some people who say I am building my dream home, and
I'm dying in this home. For them, it actually makes sense because they are not selling.
So people are holding onto their houses. There is no growth, and it's not attractive
for investors because the values are going down, not up. As an investor, who wants to do
that? You build 10 houses and the values go down because you built those 10 houses. It's
not attractive. So, as an investor, building housings here doesn' t make sense - the math.
No one will look at Greensburg and say this is place where I can build buildings. The
people who built these, they are families who have lived in the county for generations.
No one else had rental properties, so they were the only people that built new rental
properties in Greensburg. Very smart. I think they have a vacancy rate of like 1 or 2%.
I cannot imagine coming from a national paper and not stopping by and asking the
people who cover Greensburg all day long, but ifyou don 't want to see the real
Greensburg.
Right. It is inspirational. I'm privy to things that probably a lot of people are not
privy to. I struggle with that stuff. My fiancee's family owns the antique store, the
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Goodman 's. It was the only building that survived on Main Street. I'm living here for
now. So I think it can be tainted, that style ofreporting, where it' s about tempting down
this idea of sustainable living because Greensburg is sort of that trophy that, "Hey, it can
work." And that's bigger than Greensburg. That's big; that idea that living sustainably is
a good idea. In fact, it's a great idea. The more people adopt it, the more cities adopt it,
the better.

What happens if the reverse happens? What if more people come here from some other
major paper, comes to talk to you, and says "oh my god!" what happened?
I think it would actually be good. The end doesn' t justify the means. Sure we have
these new buildings, but unless we look at - what isn' t working, what didn' t work, and
the mistakes that were made - you are never going to improve on it. If it's not about
integrity in any circumstances, then it seems fake, and Greensburg isn' t able to maintain
that integrity. It just isn' t, and that's not good.
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APPENDIX B
INTERVIEW WITH THOMAS CORNS
Thomas Corns is president of Greensburg State Bank, a small bank that has been a
member of the community since 1924. According to a filing with the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation, the small bank had deposits of $49 million as of the second
quarter of 2013, down 21 % from the second quarter of 2007, when it recorded $62
million in deposits.

Thomas Corns, President of Greensburg State Bank (photo by David E. Leiva).
The rental market is a unique situation in Greensburg. Can you please explain ?
We lost 100% of our business district, and we lost 95% of all the houses in town.
Our population was 1,400. After the tornado, it was 700. Mainly, we had a lot of older
people in town. They went to live with family. They couldn't put up with the hassle of
rebuilding, so we started out at 700. We're probably at 900 now, and we' ve reached a
plateau as far as building both housing and rental property. But we're a town in western
Kansas. We don't have enough carpenters here in town to build a house or the number of
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houses that we needed all at once, so we brought carpenters in from Wichita, which is
100 miles east, to help us rebuild.
When you bring in that many people in to build that many houses, the houses are
very expensive. We have very few rental properties in town. We have three or four
people that make a business out of renting properties. And they took insurance money
that they had from the loss of their rentals, and they built some new buildings. One of
them is Monica Hayes; she lives in Mullinville. She is president of economic
development for the county. I am the treasurer of it. They built as many rental properties
as they could stand. But it's not nearly enough. We have a lot of first class houses, but we
don' t have any blue collar rental properties.
In terms of the numbers, would you say there are more or less rentals since the storm?
There is much, much less rentals than there was before the tornado. What we need
is a good size trailer park. We need to have an investor come in and build housing for the
purpose of rental. But they run into a cash problem because you can't rent them for
enough to cover the building. We're kind of at a crisis point. We need trailer parks for
low-income housing. We have several low-income rental properties - one and two
bedrooms - but there aren't enough to carry the load. We have a lot of people right now
who are in the process off erecting a big electrical feeder line that will carry all of the
windmill-generated electricity to the Kansas City area. And we don' t have enough
houses, or rental properties, or trailer parks to service the people who are constructing the
line. It' s going to be a two year project. And we can 't support the number of workers
they' re going to have here. So, they are going to have to drive 45 miles to Dodge City, 30
miles to Pratt.
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I think this is a good opportunity for someone if they wanted to construct a nice
trailer park that would be used for more than a two-year basis. We have an ongoing need.
The county asked a committee to construct a trailer park after the tornado, which we did.
It was on county property. Our term came to an end; they didn' t want to be in the trailer
park business and that' s because ofliability reasons. So we ended up closing the trailer
park down, but we had a total of $26,000 in funds earned off that trailer park, above and
beyond the expenses made just by providing a trailer park for contractors. I think we
charged them $10 per day. Anyway, point is, we need a trailer park not just for
contractors, but residents, blue collar people, things like this electrical improvement. That
would be a good opportunity for someone, but finding someone with the money that can
go in and lay in the water, sewer, and electricity, it's going to be hard to do.

Can you elaborate on the residential phenomenon? Land detection studies indicates that
lots are bigger with fewer homes, homes are more expensive. How does that translate to
you as a banker?
You' re right. People bought up the neighbor' s lot as houses were destroyed, and
doubled the size of their property to have a more spacious lot. I guess I am an example of
that. I had a house built in the early 1960s, and it wasn't totally destroyed. I spent enough
money on it to tear it down and have it rebuilt again. I bought the neighbor' s lot and the
lot across the alley. They were going to put a trailer there, and I bought that lot to control
the neighborhood. I have no use for one of the lots. Whenever I can find someone who
will build a permanent stick built house, I will be glad to sell it. But since the tornado, we
have reached a plateau of building. There is one house being constructed so far this year.
We need to have industry before we can have housing and housing before we can have
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industry. It's kind of the chicken and the egg. We' re doing our best to recruit industry.
It' s tough for a little town in western Kansas to recruit people to come into town to
establish industry when we don't have the manpower to run a business.
Our housing structure has changed a lot. On the other side of the railroad tracks
was where the people lived in the lesser houses. Then, in the southeast corner, where a lot
of old houses that had never really been improved, the tornado came along and cleaned
house for us. We' ve rebuilt this area of town with new housing. The problems that we
had north of the railroad tracks were swept away. Maybe the tornado was a mixed
blessing, I don' t know.
I can tell you that the financial statements of everybody who stayed here and
rebuilt went up substantially. In other words, they profited financially from the sale. First
of all, it' s tough to build even a modest home here - three bedrooms, two baths, two car
attached garage, ranch style. You can' t build that for less than $150,000. Before the
tornado, we had maybe one or two houses worth $100,000. Now, any house that is built
is going to have $150,000 in it and, most of them, more. So, the tornado changed all that.
So,

ifyou want to live in Greensburg, you better have some green.
One of the industries we pursued after tornado was the green industry. Everybody

wanted to be a part of it. I don' t know if you ever saw some of the programs that were
generated. They had a reality show. It was kind of a pain. I don't know that they
represented us 100%. It was an interesting thing to watch. You could see us arguing
amongst ourselves. The TV program thrived on controversy, so they would publicize that
more than some of the getting together and working together.
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It was amazing. Donations came in came to the bank. It was touching where the

money came from. All of it was small amounts. They raised hundreds of thousands.
There was a third grade class in Wichita that sent $50. They came back six months later.
It was such a success, and all of the parents thought so much of it that they sent a

substantial donation. Everybody that donated had their personal input. They had been
through controversy, or they had been through hard times. This was their repayment. We
had a millionaire, who ran an oil company, gave everybody who rebuilt a house $1 ,500.
Everybody. We probably had 400 checks for $1,500. People sent things, if they didn't
have money. They sent quilts, wash cloths. Lots of stuffed animals. The library got more
books than it could ever handle. People just wanted to help, and people came here to
help.
Knowing what you (the Greensburg leadership) know now, would there be some changes
to the recovery plan?
We' re unique because of the tornado. George W. Bush was president, and he had
been bloodied by Hurricane Katrina. He wanted to show some good things. We had the
tornado on Friday night. On Monday morning, we had these huge motor homes - 50footers - I mean they were big with satellite antennas, and they were talking to
Washington or whoever. A homeowner could come in and get financing on the spot.
From a banker's viewpoint, it was kind of hurtful because they did fixed rate loans at
2.75% for 30 years. We needed to get the town rebuilt, so that's what we needed to do.
The federal and state governments came in and took the lead, and they had a fourtier program that they helped us set up. It included business, school, governmental,
hospital. There were four areas. And each one had representatives from each of those
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organizations, and each one of them operated independently. I was in the business area.
So we went that first day and took a total of the business that would rebuild. Before the
tornado, we had 62 businesses in town. The Chamber of Commerce counted them all; 61
of them came in and said they were going to rebuild, and they did. The only one that
didn' t rebuild was a lumber yard. The government had us set up this community
rebuilding project. Actually, I had a lot of doubts about it, but it worked pretty well.
County and the city cooperated 100%. If the business people said " Hey, we want this or
we don' t want that," then that's what happened. They mayor of the town wanted a
median down Main Street one block wide. If you' re going from this side of the street to
the other side of the street, you'd have to walk a block to get through the median. The
business people said "Oh bull, we don' t want to do that." And we ended up not doing
that. It was an effective way to get rebuilt, and it was done by the consent and the
authority of the people that were in that type of business with the cooperation of the city
and the county.
I think the county was working strongly together to rebuild. That first month we
had no electricity, water, or sewer. We had electricity down this alley to service the
businesses that were going to rebuild. The rest of the town took six to eight months
before they got electricity. All the water and sewer lines had to be replaced. We did!1't
have a water tower. Until we got a water tower, they had to pressurize the water system.
We had a sewer system that was full of sand and dirt. We had houses that were destroyed.
The homes were bulldozed in. No one remembered to cap the sewer line, so we had all of
that dirt down in the sewer. So, we had to rebuild the sewer. It was 100 years old. It
needed to be rebuilt anyway. But the U.S. government came in and underwrote all of
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these infrastructure improvements that we had to have in order to even be a city. I think
Greensburg has vastly improved itself as a result of the tornado with the help of federal
funding.
The state came in and assisted that in every way. The real problem was real estate
tax valuation. We went from a town with an established tax base. I think my taxes on my
house were $1,200 a year. It' s not a fancy house - three bedroom, two baths with an
attached garage. You can't go in and raise taxes in a new town when they are trying to
build. When they get their houses built, their taxes jump from $1,200 to $5,000 a year.
We didn't have the industry to support the tax base. They set up a Neighborhood
Revitalization program, a 10-year program. You start at the first year at one-tenth of what
your taxes would be, and then every year they add 10% until at the end of 10 years, you
would pay taxes at the same level other cities, like Pratt, Dodge City, or Wichita. Right
now, our taxes here are more than they are in Wichita which has a huge tax base. If it
weren't for the state coming in and cutting us some slack on our real estate tax, I doubt
anyone would rebuild. We have another five years. Eventually, I think we are going to
see people move out. That's just one of the things we had to deal with and will have to
deal with in the future. We have neighboring towns of Haviland and Mullinville. Their
taxes have remained the same. So, when we're up to speed in five more years, they're
going to have to have their taxes brought up to what the state says that everybody else for
a house of that quality pays. It sparks some controversy between the towns.
A lot of the businesses rebuilt aren't doing so well. When it reopened, everyone
wanted to see Greensburg, the "Green City." Daniel Wallach and the GreenTown group
built some energy efficient houses. Tourists could come and stay overnight for the
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novelty and see how the construction was done. To service a lot of these people coming
to town or driving through to rubber neck the devastation, we had businesses set up for
tourism. Some of the things that normally a functional town wouldn't need. People
selling butt wax to stop the friction for a motorcyclist. There's not a whole lot of demand
for butt wax. We had people that dealt with interior decorating. We had several clothing
stores that probably don't interest the locals. There' s a western store here and that does
interest the locals. So we're kind of reaching a point where the original businesses that
went in are having a hard time - now is when they're feeling it.

How much of this is related to green economic development?
I didn' t know what "sustainable green structures" meant. Sustainable means that it
can support itself. But defining that, took us a while to figure that out. When we were
rebuilding, most of us in town, built ICF block. This is defined as two thick slabs of
Styrofoam, one on the inside of the building, one on the outside, with a one-foot or larger
reinforced concrete in between. That makes a building virtually tornado proof. The roof
may leave, but that' s like a safety valve. Your windows will implode; your roof will
explode. The theory is that if you have this structure, it is your most efficient building in
town - walls are 55-60% efficient - as opposed to a normal house that is 19-20%
efficient, and that's what this building is built with, ICF block. Steel is cheap. Rebar is
cheap. I put enough rebar in this one-story building that I could have built a five-story
building. If we have another tornado, all we need to do is slap a roof on it, and we' re in
business. We' re going to have the walls. We would have lost our windows. We can
rebuild faster next time. A lot of the houses are built that way; a lot of the garages are
built that way.
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When you look at the tax rolls, when you see the empty lots, when you don 't see the
activity you would probably prefer to see, what does that tell you about the future?

I've got a new picture out here on the lobby. It was taken in 1952 by my dad, who
enjoyed photography. It shows Greensburg on a Saturday night when all the farmers
came into town, and it shows Main Street lit up more than it was before the tornado.
Every single space was filled with a car. Every single family from all the farmers around
came into town on Saturday night. It was kind of a quaint thing, but it just shows the level
of business that we had in 1952 as opposed to now. If you came into town on a Saturday
night, there wouldn't be any cars on the Main Street, and no businesses opened. It used to
be that everybody came into town; all the businesses stayed open until 9 pm. The show
was open; all the kids went to the show and had an ice cream cone.
Knowing what you know now,

ifsomeone said the tornado happens, would you say give

us the $100 million, would the city still go the same route that it did?

The leadership, I think, would still go the same route. We had all of these federal
people, and they stayed for a long time. A lot of them had been through Katrina and had
seen the horrors. Katrina was a mental attitude, "Federal government, give me
everything; supply me with everything." Here, we were pulling ourselves up by our own
bootstrap. Sure, we took money to put in the infrastructure. We had to have it, or it
wouldn't have happened. At some point early on, the federal government had a meeting. I
didn't know anything about it. They were deciding whether to rebuild this town or not. I
would have liked to have been a part of that meeting. The answer was yes. It would have
been terrible if the government hadn 't come in and given us help. Part of it was a political
decision; government wanted to show a good face after Katrina. I can deal with that. It' s
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part of the reason why we don' t get along with the neighboring towns. They feel that we
got everything. Their attitude is they wouldn' t have taken anything if it were them. Well,
bull shit. Sure you would. They don' t feel we did the right thing. We did what we had to
do. I don't think we took anything we didn' t have to have, or didn 't need, or shouldn't
have. The attitude of Greensburg was "help us or get out of the way." People who came
in from USDA weren' t used to being pushed. We wanted to get it done and over with.
We were pushing to get things done. Katrina wasn 't that way.
It will take at least 20 years to get our feet back on solid ground. We' ve come six

years - made a lot of progress in six years.

Is there anything that I should ask you that I haven 't asked you, or do you have any
comments you would like to add?
Each of the four community organizations met monthly at the center. It was a
very cooperative time. We would have city meetings under a tent out at the park because
we didn't have a building to put them in. Everybody worked together. Maybe now things
are easier than they were back then. We've gotten away from that. We've lost a lot of the
contact between each other, a lot of the cooperation. We need to figure out a way to get
that back because we're still struggling just as much as we were before. We have more
houses and more buildings, but we need to take care of and service the businesses that we
have now.
We' ve lost some businesses on Main Street, and one of them was a clothing store.
And the home furnishings store is probably going to go out. We need more cooperation.
Instead of automatically driving to Wal-Mart in Pratt or heading into Wichita, if that
money stays here, it' s going to turn over six or seven times. If it goes to Wichita, we' ll
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never see it again. We need to be trying to work together still, just as much as we ever
were, because just as much is at stake.
We're at the point where the real estate tax realization is going to kick in. We' ve
reached a plateau on building. We' ve lost some businesses; we have some empty
business spaces here. We're starting to pull back and stay at home and watch TV, instead,
of going to all of those meetings. We did a lot, and that's the only reason we've gone as
far as we have in five or six years. We went to those meetings and all worked together.
We're kind oflosing that. We can't slack off. We still need to recruit businesses. It's
always tough to recruit business in a little town.
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APPENDIXC
INTERVIEW WITH MICHAEL GURNEE
J. Michael Gurnee, who received his masters in city planning from Georgia Tech, is
originally from Kentucky. He spent the last 12 years in neighboring Dodge City before
arriving in Greensburg. Initially working fulltime, he accepted a part-time consultant
position with the city to help with planning and zoning issues. He said he usually works
10 to 20 hours per month.
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J. Michael Gurnee, Contracted City Planner for Greensburg (photo by David E. Leiva).

What role does the city 's 2008 comprehensive plan play in terms ofeconomic
development?
The comprehensive plan, in addition to many other things, is an economic
development tool of how to grow, in our case, redevelop. The plan lays the framework
through mapping of where certain things may or may not be located, what is best
environmentally, and economic development of how should business, industry, retailing
come back to Greensburg. The plan talks about the fashion of it being green, but in
general terms, any comprehensive plan should discuss these economic development
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issues of how are we going to grow, what mistakes were made in the past that can be
corrected. And, sorry, we had a lovely opportunity to redevelop. Some things in the plan
were political; things have changed. At first, it looked like there was going to be a major
industrial park northeast of the cemetery and that was because of one projected
development, but it fell through. The actual development that we got is the business park
that is due east. Have you talked to anyone about the commercial development on Main
Street, and how it was done?
No.
Individual contributions from citizens to build what looks like a strip mall. It was
great. But I'm not sure where you want to go, or where I can help you with this. The
development of the plan was ...
Where you involved in it?
It started before I came. I have been involved in its execution and adoption. The

consultant had already been identified when I got here. Some of the first proposals were
not accepted, and that makes it a good planning document. Some of the citizens got
involved and said, "We don ' think this will work; we' d like to see it another way." One
example of that was Main Street was originally envisioned to have green space in
between both sides of Main Street, that it would be half a block stretched out with
greenery of some kind in between like a huge traffic island. And the realtors and
merchants said, "That' s not going to work because we want people to be able to walk
from one side of the street to the other, and if you put a half a block of a park in between
then they are going to be less likely to have the pedestrian activity that you want." So that
was taken out of the plan. The mayor really wanted it. He thought it was a marvelously
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looking plan, and he was ready to go up in arms to fight for that first version. But I'm
glad that the citizens won - not just one person saying that this looks like a good concept.
So we got what we have now. It' s sad that the economy tanked at the same time that we
were doing all this.
You couldn 't ask for any worse luck.

We' ve had some very good people involved in economic development, and we
just haven't been able to get the people or industry that we' ve wanted.
That according to the plan would have fit in perfectly with Greensburg.

It' s always difficult when you are trying to do things differently. The individual
businesses that act like they are interested often just want to do the same things that
they've done ever since they started, instead of focusing on the environmental type
issues. It' s a learning curve that your more experienced, more knowledgeable architects,
engineers, and corporations understand, but your small business person has a hard time
seeing the rate ofreturn is going to be adequate if they go the extra expense of being
more green. We' ve been fortunate, and sometimes I agree with them. A lot of the socalled "green initiatives" were very, very expensive. Lately, the price has gone down on
some of them very significantly. I can just give you a personal example.
A company from Australia donated toilets for people who were rebuilding here,
and they were dual flush, super environmentally water saving devices. I looked them up,
and they were $300 to $400 each for a toilet. I recently replaced a toilet that can do the
same things but can do it for $150. More engineering is going into things, and prices are
coming down. But I don't know if that' s economic development or not.
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Can you point me to some documents that might help explain the direction that the town
is now going to develop?
Do you want to talk about business and industry or residential?

Both, since I have you here.
Business and industry is going exactly as the plan prognosticated or directed.
Residential, not quite so. Immediately after the storm, the first people that rebuilt, built in
the large lot, suburban style. A lot of this town is plotted on 25-foot lots. Where they used
to have a house on, say, two to three lots with 50 to 75 feet of frontage, they bought more
and more lots so they could have a larger lots. So the high density housing didn' t occur.

Was that something unexpected?
Not by me. I suspected they wanted their little piece of suburbia, and neighboring
lots were very inexpensive. So, they got elbow room. The plan concept of high density
living, pedestrian orientation is a great concept, but I knew that was for newcomers, not
the ones that had been here before. The ones who had been here before were not the type
of people who wanted to live in a second floor loft; they wanted their house. Now, the
second floor lofts and high density housing was more for the young urban professionals
that we want to attract. The plan showed the high density housing surrounding the
downtown core in a very, very expansive area. Shortly after the whole thing was adopted
- zoning is a way to implement the plan' s land use section - we reduced the scope of that
high density housing so that more of the suburban type development could occur, but we
still left the area for the high density housing and loft development. It has not occurred
yet because we don' t have the businesses to bring in the young professionals that we
want.
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Do you believe that the urban planner is best equipped to deal with long-term recovery?
I think the planner' s forte is to work for collaboration among the groups much
more so than drawing pretty maps. Planners, as a profession, can only do what they are
allowed to do. It all depends on whether you have a strong administration. And, in our
case at that time, a strong governor and members of the City Council, and the city
administrator said, "We want to see a good plan." And they even had a moratorium on
building permits until we could get our act together. It was later repealed, but we had
enough in place that we were able to accomplish what we wanted. So, in effect, some
things were done according to the plan before it was adopted because everyone was
together. We knew what we wanted. We knew what we statutorily could and could not
do. On high density housing, we would have somebody come here who had just bought
five lots - an entire city half block - and wanted to put their house on it. We would say
things like, "Don' t situate your house so that some day in the future you would prohibit
further development. In other words, you can put it in the middle or put it on one end, but
don' t straddle so many lots that someday later could not be subdivided and made more
dense." It was just power of persuasion. Most of them agreed. It's good folks to work
with out here. I was here fulltime for about three years. I just wish we had the jobs.

Is there any thing that disappoints you, outside ofjobs, things that didn 't quite pan out?
Architects, engineers, and planners that have a "Holier than Thou" attitude and
think that they are God. That's the only thing that disappoints me.
" Here' s what I can do for you! " when the question should be. "What can I do for
you?" When they were choosing the planning consulting firm, people were brought in
with very big titles. The ones we chose has a very big name; they were people who had
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backings, some really far out ideas. One person who kept in touch with me wanted to
build the town into a single structure. I can't remember the name for it. He' s from
California. It' s a beautiful idea in a place that needs a high-rise single structure - Tokyo.
But not Kiowa County, Kansas.

This was a planner 's paradise. It was an opportunity to start from scratch.
Almost, but you have to be willing to understand the culture of rural Kansas. A
big city idea, if you present it that way, is not going to be listened to, and the consultants
that we had did a great job because everything that we have is a big city idea. We just
never used the terminology that made it sound that way. Plus, the citizens come from a
good farm, agricultural stock. They understand conservation because that' s the way you
raise cattle. That's the way you grow crops. You've got to understand the environment to
farm. So, a lot of the environmental awareness was already there in the back of the
citizens' minds. So, it wasn' t too terrible of a sales pitch. They already understood what
conservation was all about.
The downturn in population after the storm wanted to leave anyway. They wanted
to be closer to their children who had moved to Kansas City or Denver. The ones that
stayed were, for the most part, younger and still had a stake in the community. We knew
that there was a significant portion of the population that was not going to come back.
They took their insurance check and ran.

How did someone assume that the population would be restored in.five years?
We were on track to do it in the first two years; it's just that we never attracted the
industry to keep it going. We never wanted a large industry. We were looking for 20 to .
50 employees' type companies. And I know that the state was willing to give all kinds of
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tax incentives. I don't know why it never happened. If we had gotten those, I think that
five year projection would have been correct of being back to where we were. It' s
difficult to make population projections with having a disaster, so those numbers that you
saw were more faith and hope.
In planning, the terms are long-term plans and strategic plans, with those being
five years with more identifiable goals. Sometimes you will see both of them in one
document. Our comprehensive plan is more of a strategic plan of what do we want to do
in the next five years. And I've worked 35 years in six communities. This is the first one
that they are developing things, according to the plan.
Most of our development has been from the public sector: library, City Hall,
redevelopment of the county court house, hospital, school. We were fortunate in that we
were able to get the business incubator as one of the first structures. I have noticed that a
couple of people have graduated out.
Somebody like Thomas Corns may have told you this, but there were a lot of
negative people on the outside - a lot of potential investors and lending institutions - said
"Forget it, it's not going to work." Just because! And when I was here fulltime, when
somebody came in with that attitude I would say, "Sorry, I've got someone here waiting
for me that wants to build. Get out!" A professional office used to be here and decided
not to come here after the storm. I don' t know why there were here in the first place. I
don't know why they came to visit me. I don't remember. There were some people who
thought they could make a fast dollar, especially Subway Restaurants. I don' t know why,
but there must be something about them. We had several people come in with the idea of
building a Subway restaurant, and one person came in and said, "You don't have any of
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those darn building codes, do you?" I said "Not only that, but we want a licensed
architect to design your building." "Well, I'll go someplace else." Okay, sayonara. We
don't want them.
The typical economic development strategy is what the community's assets and
needs analysis indicate. Where are you losing market share to another community? None
of that really applies to a town that is destroyed. Now, it might help with future growth,
and I don't know what the economic development strategy has been for the last couple of
years here. I just don't know. I know the main push is to attract businesses and industry
to the now vacant business park.
One thing and I've said this in a different arena. I said, "Shut it down." But then
when I came here and started talking to people and measuring their resolve, I decided
we're doing the right thing. It's been fun.

Would you change anything?
No. I can't' think of anything. It's always great when your last job is your best
job. I never knew my career would end this way, and I'm gratified to have been a part of
it.
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APPENDIX D
INTERVIEW WITH CHRISTY PY ATT
Christy Pyatt, city clerk at the city of Greensburg, started working three weeks before the
tornado. Having grown up in the area, she was initially hired to handle the billing of
utilities. After the tornado destroyed the infrastructure, she was part of the newly
established building department, a position that she would juggle along with the
municipal court clerk duties.

Christy Pyatt, City Clerk at the City of Greensburg (photo by David E. Leiva).

You are very busy with all ofyour assigned jobs. How did you come to do it all?
At some point, we transitioned, and I started doing the financial portions of City
projects, still doing court clerk, still working with building and zoning. In a small town,
you carry many hats. So tonight, I will be in City Council; I get a brief break between
City Council- go usually to 8pm. Grew up here. In this office, you don't have divisions
of who does what so much; it's really a group effort. Ed Truelove, the city administrator,
and I tag team a lot just to cover our bases and check up on each other as far as "Did we
get all of this taken care of?"
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We do things a little differently around here, where we have a city treasurer and a
utility billings clerk. We do have more employees than most small towns but because of
our disaster, you had to. We have scaled back. We don' t have nearly as many employees
as we did right after the disaster, but that means you get to wear more hats. Like
tomorrow night, our judge will be coming in, so I will be staying for court a little while.
And it won't be a long court because here most of it right now is traffic, but you ... just
wear a lot of hats.

Who could tell me about rental vacancies?
Monica Hayse will be able to tell you a lot about rentals as well. She is the
primary property owner. She owns a lot of the rental properties that are up and going. She
and her husband own Hayse Management. They have a lot of properties, commercial and
residential properties. He contracts with Kansas Gas Service, so they have a utilities side
to their company. They are very active. They are great community supporters. They have
been on school boards. She' s on economic development. They own the property where
"FEMAville" - that' s what we call it - where all the FEMA trailers used to be. They had
the opportunity, and this is where both of them grew up. This is how they support their
community.

Has anyone asked these types (financial) of questions?
No, they haven't, and sometimes it takes somebody stepping in from the outside
to get a different perspective, kind of like the development here. If you are here every
single day, you don' t necessarily see the progress. But if you're gone a little while and
you come back ... "Wow, that' s changed!'
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Monica may be able to help you with revitalized properties because they had
some properties that sustained damage that they renovated. They have some properties
that the purchased since the tornado and renovated. They have some that they had to start
from scratch. So she can give you a lot of information on the housing situation from her
perspective.

I think that 's one ofthe scary parts about the Greensburg experiment. If so much weight,
so much expectations are placed, and it doesn 't materialize. Many will dismiss green
economic development.
These were goals as where we would like to be, but there are a lot of things that
play into it. When the state economy struggles, we are not at this point, and we knew that
was going to happen. You don't want to be in the spotlight forever. As citizens, these
guys are ready to move on. They don't want their entire lives to rotate around the
tornado. Unfortunately, that major event in history changed a lot of things, so there are
some things that will have to be. Like it or not, the tornado will be referenced as to when
things happened or didn't happen. But as far as being in the limelight, that' s not what this
community is about. It really isn' t. We were for a long time, but that wasn't their main
focus - to get attention, to get people here. At the same time, we recognize that without
some of that attention, we wouldn't be where we are because it got the ball moving on
some things. Whereas it might have gotten tied up in bureaucracy or something, there
were some things that got taken care of that needed to happen quickly because we were in
the spotlight, and everyone was watching. You don' t want to be the governor or the
senator who kept people who have lost everything from being able to move forward.
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So there were some benefits to being recognized so much in the media, but we
knew that was short term. And we weren' t trying to take that and use necessarily as an
advantage to gain anything. Especially like in tourism, when you' re in the news media,
you're going to have a lot more people in town, and that helps the businesses. It helps
everything here in town. But when that media spotlight goes away, you're not going to
have near the foot traffic that you had so as a business you have to learn how to evolve.
You have to learn how to sustain yourself when all the attention is gone. I think
these people did a fairly good job of thinking that way knowing "this is who we've got
here really every day" and not focus on what was happening in the moment as far as
people through here. It is definitely a different world than it was even five years ago
because there would have been tourists walking all around and school groups here just
everywhere. The place was covered with people. You would be amazed if you go over to
the Big Well Museum at how many people come from other states, other countries,
school groups, tourists, tours that come through here. Part of it is to see the Big Well, but
part of it is to see how they are doing five, six years later.

Total Cash Receipts ofBig Well Fund 2007-2012
2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

$137,073

$331,160

$184,309

$144,199

$130,994

$231,112

"City of Greensburg, Kansas Financial Statements with Independent Auditor's Report," City of Greensburg, 2006-2012.

It's a slower traffic than it was before, so you can' t say " we don' t want to talk
about the tornado anymore" and be oblivious to the fact that it happened because it
changed everything. It changed the way town looks. It changed how we function, and not
all for the bad. Some of the things needed to change; it wasn't working the way it was
working before. So, you either keep doing what you've been doing and have it continue
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to not work, or you change what you are doing, do things differently, and hopefully,
things will tum around. That' s the kind of the attitude our County Commissioners and
City Council took. This is an opportunity to change things. We can' t change the fact the
tornado happened. We can' t put things back the way they were, so let's take what we've
got and change it.
We were nearly completely knocked off the map. It wasn't just the town. We have
a whole Mennonite community. It went up through their farm houses, so a lot of them
lost everything too. We were so inundated with people coming to help that we started
sending people their way. But everyone was focused on the city because that' s where
most of the population was, where most of the destruction was. But there is a whole
community south of here that took a big hit with their school, and then more communities
to the north of us that the storm tracked right in the middle of them and for two or three
days after, the same storm track. So, this wasn' t just Greensburg. This affected Kiowa
County, the surrounding areas. That's probably one of the most frustrating things with the
other communities is that it affected them so greatly, but Greensburg was getting most of
the attention. I bet if you went to talk to Haviland ' s City Hall, you would find a huge
difference in how their town has worked since the tornado because a lot of people, even if
it was only temporarily, went to Haviland. There wasn't a house to be had in Haviland.
Houses that would have sat on the market for a long time, sold very quickly. Rentals went
very quickly. I would be interested to know; I bet their rents are higher because there was
such high demand. And so, we had all of these displaced people going to all of these
communities, so their life was all in upheaval. Plus, a lot of people come here to shop and
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different things; they all had to disperse and go to other towns. So this didn't just affect
Greensburg, it affected this whole area.
But I bet if you looked at some of the number of housing in Haviland and
Mullinville, it would be an interesting change in the number of homes sold, new builds.
Haviland has several new builds, and not all are directly associated with the tornado, but
some people who used to live here live in Haviland now. And so, on their statistics that
looks huge because these were small towns and not a lot of people were moving to or
building. Part of it was that former Greensburg residents wanted something done quickly,
and we had cleanup to do. So, they went where they could quickly put something in.
Some of them didn ' t want any regulation put on them, so they went and quickly put in a
home in a neighboring community that maybe didn' t have building and zoning
regulations. There's a lot that went into it.
FEMA just kept telling us how they couldn't believe the resiliency of people
around here because we had a house that got put back on its existing basement before we
had utilities back in town. So they have this new home sitting there, and can't live in it
because we don' t have utilities restored yet. But they were like "we're not going to sit
around helpless. Let's go! Let's go! Let's go! "
There's de.finitely a different vibe here than other disaster areas.
They had the same problem in Joplin, Missouri. Right after the Joplin tornado,
their building official called me and said, "What do you do when you' re still doing search
and rescue for bodies, and you' ve got Joe Blow over here who ' s got his friends in here to
clean off his property and he's ready to start building?" You put a moratorium on the
town, and you don' t let people start building until you' re done with search and rescue or
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until you get your streets cleared. But in some areas of this country and some parts of the
world, it wouldn' t necessarily move that fast. They wouldn' t have had Day 1 the tornado
happened - and by the end of the week he has cleaned up and is ready to start building.
It' s just a different mindset.
Are there any building permit figures prior to the storm?
They didn ' t really have houses built. There was nothing really going on here, in
terms of building. And like a building permit was $1. They had adopted some codes, but
they had no one to enforce them. The last house that was built here was probably four
years before the tornado. They didn't have a building inspector. We had no building
inspector in this community, as far as I know, until after the tornado. And, the state
association of building inspectors, The Heart of America chapter, came in and brought in
building inspectors to help look at structures that were still standing, get a building
department established. Johnson County, which is Kansas City area, sent a lot of guys out
here just to get a building department established, get the forms put together, get
spreadsheets put together. I am still operating off a Johnson County building permit
system that they created in their own office to fit them, and they retrofitted it just to get
us by. We had nothing, absolutely nothing.
We didn' t lose as many city documents even though City Hall was heavily
damaged. Someone came in, took our documents, and freeze dried them and stored them
for us. We didn' t lose nearly the documentation that you think we did. And they were
able to take our computers, dry them out, and retrieve information. They did the same
thing at the county. The main server is in the basement area, serious water damage. The
first day I walked into the court house, which was like a day or two later, there was
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literally water running down the stairways. It was like a stream running from the upper
floors down into the basement where their server was because a car flew over the top of
the court house and hit the roof. It was a Pontiac Bonneville. They figured out what car it
was because there was blue paint on top of the roof, and there was a blue Pontiac
Bonneville laying in the side yard of the court house when it was all over. That thing
blew over the top of the dome, hit that on the upper floor, and it just poured rain during
the storm. It rained during the storm, it rained after the storm, and it rained for a good
three days if not longer. We had storms in and out of here all the time, dumping rain and
hail; tornados on the same storm track. We had people trying to do search and rescue, and
they had to evacuate into existing basements because another tornado was coming. I
remember getting stuck in the basement of the court house, and it was jam-packed with
rescue workers, all in fire gear with rescue dogs, because another tornado was tracking
the exact same path coming right at us. And, we all hunkered down in the basement of
the court house that had already been hit once. And it happened all week long, storms
tracking like that.

Knowing what you the Greensburg leadership know now, would there be some changes
to the recovery plan?
Probably. Knowing what we know now, we would have done some things
differently. Yes, you learn a lot. Even the school will tell you, because they' re doing an
addition to the school; they' re changing some things. It' s going to look the same, but they
are not using all of the same materials; they' re not using some of the things that they used
in the original building because they' ve had time to figure out what works and what
didn' t work. Would we do streetscape the same? No, probably not. The idea was to build
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it walkable so you widen the sidewalks. Well, that cut down on your street. We knew that
was going to happen, but to live it and realize the impact that that has on trying to back in
and back out, and all of these little bumps out in the streets. Try doing snow removal with
those. On paper, it looks nice. But to the guy running a truck, he knows that when there is
three to four feet of snow drifted in there, he' s not going to know where that bump out is
at, and you' re going to get things like what happened out here at this stop sign.
Functionality. Storm water collection is great for watering, but it has to rain. If it doesn't
rain, there's no water to get in the tank. Yes, there are things we' ve learned functionality.

Seems like the city should get into the consulting business.
The mayor has done a lot oftalking with other communities. We have
communities that didn't even get destroyed by disasters that are just wanting to build
more sustainable, and they will call and say "What worked, what didn't work?"
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